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Abstract
A Reexamination of the Distributive Politics Model and the Allocation of Federal
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Dollars
Howard A. Stern
The literature on the distributive politics model suggests that elected officials
strategically allocate public benefits to curry favors, secure votes and gain reelection.  In
other words, elected officials distribute public benefits in such a way as to enhance their
own personal careers and goals. Unfortunately, this centralized, top-down perspective
(Rich 1989), which focuses exclusively on the motivations of the elected officials, fails to
consider the political, economic and social characteristics of the governmental
unit represented by the officials.  These contextual factors may influence the allocation
decisions made by the elected officials. Thus, an expanded distributive politics model --
one that takes into account the form of government, size of city, geographical region, per
capita income and poverty level of the jurisdiction -- may better explain allocation
decisions made by elected officials than the traditional model. Specifically, this research
will examine how and why cities and their elected representatives allocate federal
community development block grant (CDBG) dollars.  The main contribution of this
work is to offer a more comprehensive approach that considers a variety of contextual
factors ignored by the traditional distributive politics model. Expanding the traditional
distributive politics model to include a thorough understanding of the saliency and role of
contextual factors will result in easier and more reliable predictions about how public
benefits are likely to be allocated.
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On August 22, 1974, Congress enacted the Housing and Community
Development Act to create a new initiative called the Community Development Block
Grant (CDBG) program.  This program was designed to consolidate seven existing
federal assistance programs -- model cities, urban renewal, rehabilitation loans, public
facility loans, water and sewer facilities, open spaces, and neighborhood facilities -- into
one comprehensive program.  The primary objectives of the newly created CDBG
program were to improve overall living conditions and to expand economic opportunities
for low and moderate income neighborhoods by granting entitlement cities the discretion
to select and fund projects that would be most beneficial to the cities’ low and moderate
income residents.
The CDBG program represented a sea change from past federal grant award
practices.  The devolution of grant dollars directly to the cities, with minimal federal
intervention, was unprecedented.  As long as the cities were able to meet the guidelines
of this new program, the federal government would allow entitlement communities to
make their own decisions about where and how they would use federal CDBG dollars.
When the CDBG program was created, President Gerald Ford was clear that control
would be in local hands: “In a very real sense, this bill will help to return power from the
banks of the Potomac to people in their own communities.  Decisions will be made at the
local level.  Action will come at the local level.  And responsibility for results will be
placed squarely where it belongs – at the local level.” (Ford 1974).
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Under the CDBG program, national officials allocate federal dollars to
municipalities according to a formula that determines a city’s entitlement status.  The
cities themselves are then supposed to plan, implement and administer those projects
most beneficial to the welfare of a city’s populace, with the emphasis on providing
programs, services and improved infrastructure to underserved areas.  But, as my
research into local allocation practices will demonstrate, when local officials act as
trustees of federal government monies, numerous complex issues surrounding decision-
making, distribution and accountability arise.   Local officials understand that if they fail
to implement a federal distributive program in the spirit with which it was intended, then
the entitlement community can risk losing the federal appropriation.  On the other hand,
local officials also must negotiate the pressures of various, powerful internal and external
demands. An official might feel pressured by the internal demands of her personal beliefs
and values to make good public policy decisions.  External forces and factors such as
special interest groups, the state of the local and national economy, the agendas of
congressional representatives and the scope and slant of media coverage can also exert
considerable pressure on a local official’s grant-distribution decision-making processes.
Whether internal or external in origin, the demands and interests vying for a local
official’s notice and ongoing consideration significantly complicate the local grant
allocation process, a process that, by vesting power at the local level, the CDBG program
sought to simplify and improve.
The local-level independence and flexibility allowed by the program often
permitted entitlement cities to allocate CDBG dollars in ways that significantly
compromised the program’s spirit and intent.  In some cases, cities allocated federal
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dollars to projects that otherwise would have been funded by their own operating
budgets.  In other cases, local officials used CDBG monies to further their own political
aspirations and leverage, allocating the federal grant monies to local projects that
increased these local politicians’ own immediate visibility, rather directing the grant
dollars to projects that clearly benefited a community’s underserved citizens.  Over the
more than thirty years since the CDBG’s first awards were granted, allocation decisions
at the local level have increasingly been driven, not by the needs of cities’ lower and
moderate income citizens, but by a multitude of contextual and social influences ranging
from personal self-interest to racial demographics to local and federal political
aspirations.
So what caused this apparent disconnect between federal lawmakers’ original
intentions and local officials’ actual practices? Why have Congress’s CDBG hopes been
dashed at the street level?  What role does the fragmentation of government and the
importance of representation play in the allocation of CDBG funds?  The answers to
these questions are difficult to fully determine, but often hinge on a host of contextual
factors, including the prevailing economic, political and social environment of the grant-
receiving city, the political visibility and approbation so valuable to the local and federal
officials, and the complexities of intergovernmental relations.  Since political and
economic conditions in different parts of the country vary and because governmental
structures vary among cities, the allocation processes of cities not only depart from
congressional expectations, but also vary city to city.
To illustrate how these contextual factors influence the CDBG allocations of local
officials, consider the experiences of two mayors in different parts of the same state:
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Mayor W. Wilson Goode in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Mayor Robert Price in
Sharon, Pennsylvania.  A comparison of how CDBG monies were used by their
administrations points to the internal and external pressures that influence both national
and local officials’ CDBG decisions, and the extent to which these decisions comport
with the program’s intended spirit.
By all accounts, Philadelphia Mayor W. Wilson Goode was the poster child for
federal (CDBG) initiatives.  He was responsive to his community’s needs, he assembled a
competent and professional staff, and the projects and programs he selected were
consistent with the national government’s program goals and objectives of serving low
and moderate-income communities (Kettl 1980, 19).  He directed a large proportion of
Philadelphia’s CDBG monies toward vacant house and rental rehabilitation assistance in
targeted neighborhoods.  These projects were costly and politically inefficient, in that
they benefited only a small fraction of Philadelphia’s population: the poorest and least
powerful segment of the community.  Interestingly, Goode made these spending
commitments to benefit the poor and vulnerable, and allocated these funds consistent
with primary CDBG objectives, during his second and final term in office.
In contrast, during his first term in office, when he was concerned about seeking
reelection and securing votes from a broader cross-section of the population, Mayor
Goode allocated nearly $7,000,000 of CDBG money for city-wide site improvements.
His commitment to rebuilding the City’s infrastructure and to increasing economic
development opportunities and his allocation of millions of dollars from his CDBG
budget for city-wide improvements and initiatives earned him widespread approval.  Note
that during his reelection bid, Goode spent far less money on the poor neighborhoods the
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CDBG dollars were supposed to benefit, and more on city-wide projects that benefited
wealthier, more politically active constituents.  In fact, he committed 90 percent more
money to city-wide site improvement projects during the four year term preceding his
reelection bid than in the four years that followed it (Consolidated Community
Development Plan 1984-1991).
Like Mayor Goode, Mayor Robert Price of Sharon, Pennsylvania, was also
considered a champion of CDBG program initiatives (Tolbert 2005).  He too assembled a
competent staff, listened to the needs of his constituency and diligently followed the
national government’s required program rules and regulations.  Unlike Goode, however,
Price allocated a consistent and somewhat predictable percentage of his federal CDBG
budget to city-wide projects such as improvements to many public facilities.  There
seemed to be few variations in his funding allocations, and they did not appear to
fluctuate during any of his electoral cycles.
So what accounts for the dramatic CDBG allocation shifts seen during
Philadelphia Mayor Goode’s tenure, and what accounts for the consistency of allocations
during Price’s many years as Mayor of Sharon?  Why do mayors spend federal CDBG
dollars the way they do?  Do mayors shift priorities from one type of project to another
because they believe that some projects have electoral effects?  Does the form of
government matter (and the concomitant actual power of the mayor) matter?  Do
communities with large minority populations, relatively high per capita incomes, or low
unemployment rates allocate their CDBG dollars differently from communities with large
majority populations, high per capita incomes, or low unemployment rates?  What factors
or influences alter the motivations or decision-making of elected officials?
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As we will see, a combination of behavioral and contextual factors explain the
allocation decisions made by local-level elected officials in distributing CDBG monies.
Questions of the Study
The decision-making process of elected officials is a central concern of those who
study how policies are developed and implemented.  The motivation of individual
players, coupled with the political, economic and social characteristics of the
organizations those individuals control, can play a salient role in the policy-making
process. The distributive politics model illustrates and explains this decision-making
process.  In conjunction with a demand-side explanation, this model suggests that the
behaviors and decisions of elected officials are explained by their desire to get reelected,
by their need to do what is right, and by their quest for power (Mayhew 1979, Savage
1999).  This model focuses on the perceptions of elected federal officials to explain how
and why government benefits are allocated (Rich 1989).  The distributive politics model
maintains that these particular motivations are the primary determining factors in
officials’ decision-making processes.
Although helpful in explaining the decision-making process of local officials, the
distributive politics model is not sufficiently nuanced to explain decisions, such as the
allocation of CDBG monies.  To better understand the behaviors of elected officials at the
local level, it is imperative to understand the demand-side explanation of federal aid
allocation and by expanding the traditional distributive politics model.  The demand-side
explanation suggests that not all recipients are equally capable of applying for and
obtaining federal grant dollars (Stein 1981).  The monetary and human costs of accepting
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a federal grant, such as matching requirements and reporting data, can be an exhaustive
and expensive undertaking.
Through an expanded distributive politics model -- one that takes into account the
motivation, form of government, size of city, geographical region, per capita income,
race and poverty level of the jurisdiction -- it is possible to better explain the allocation
decisions made by local elected officials, particularly mayors.  An expanded model will
contribute to the understanding of intergovernmental relations by offering a more
comprehensive approach that considers a variety of contextual factors ignored by the
traditional distributive politics model.
 This study will test the demand-side explanation of federal grant dollars and an
expanded distributive politics model by examining the federally funded CDBG program.
The federal CDBG program serves as an excellent vehicle for testing an expanded
distributive politics model for two reasons.  First, as long as a city meets the population
requirement, it will be eligible for federal CDBG monies with very few qualifications or
requirements.  Basically, the federal government devolves CDBG funds to state and local
governments irrespective of economic health, region or politics.  Because of the general
availability of CDBG monies and the enormous flexibility cities enjoy in distributing
these funds, this program provides an excellent opportunity to study how and why
government benefits are allocated.  Second, the federal government maintains detailed
data on the CDBG program, which permits careful analysis of the role that the contextual
factors play in the allocation of federal dollars.
The CDBG program represents a real commitment to the cities and
neighborhoods by the federal government and enjoys bi-partisan support from Congress;
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both Democrats and Republicans.  More importantly, the whole concept of CDBG
represented a shift or devolution of control from the federal government to the cities.
Previously, categorical grants were the most common ways that the federal government
disbursed monies to the local governments on a project-by-project basis.  Categorical
grants gave the federal bureaucracy much more power in the approval process and
ensured that local governments used federal dollars that were consistent with the national
governments priorities at the time (Friedland and Wong 1983).  When the federal
government decided to shift from categorical to block grants, the rigid guidelines
imposed on the localities were loosened and the project-by-project approval process
dissipated. As long as the vague CDBG guidelines were met, cities can implement the
projects and programs of their choice with little accountability.  The reasoning behind the
flexibility of the CDBG program is that the decision makers at the local level are
inherently more knowledgeable and responsive to their community’s needs (Pratt
Institute Center for Community and Environmental Development 2001) than the national
government.
According to HUD, CDBG monies can be used for a variety of projects to
improve housing, public buildings, green spaces, transportation and jobs.  Projects
ranging from street resurfacing to playground rehabilitation are eligible under this
program.  It is not uncommon for an ice skating rink or a firehouse to be remodeled using
CDBG monies. Although the program is targeted towards low and moderate-income
neighborhoods, the program guidelines are vague and ambiguous.  As a result, a large
percentage of CDBG funds can be spent anywhere within an entire community providing
that the programs targeted sector benefits as well.  The CDBG program devolves benefit
9
dollars directly to local governments to allocate to their constituents, often with very few
and vague guidelines.  As a result, CDBG recipient jurisdictions enjoy immense
flexibility in the disbursement of these federal benefit dollars.
The key question I am asking is whether the inclusion of contextual factors, that
are ignored by the traditional distributive politics model, result in easier and more reliable
predictors about how public benefits are likely to be allocated?  Specifically, I examine
the choices made by local officials’ regarding distributive programs and how they impact
recipient jurisdictions and their constituents.  To deal with this issue, I will offer a
demand-side explanation in the distribution of federal CDBG monies and an expanded
distributive politics model to articulate and to answer the following research questions:
What influences and motivations drive an official’s decision-making process in the
allocation of CDBG dollars?  Does form of government and size of city help explain how
CDBG monies are allocated?  Do wealthier cities allocate CDBG dollars differently than
poorer cities? Does geographical region influence funding decisions?  Do allocation
decisions vary during Republican or Democratic administrations?  Does incumbency
matter?  What role does a professional CDBG staff play in the allocation of CDBG
federal aid monies?  Do stakeholders really care if CDBG monies are allocated
equitably? These questions will be answered through a case study of four Pennsylvania
cities and through a statistical analysis of the actual CDBG allocations reported by the
U.S. Department of Housing for every large and small entitlement city in the fifty United
States and the District of Columbia.
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Contributions of this Research
This research introduces a more sophisticated distributive politics framework, one
that considers a demand-side explanation, to help define the motivations and behaviors of
local elected officials.  This framework will demonstrate that mayors allocate public
dollars based on the political, economic and social environment around them.  Expanding
the traditional distributive politics model to include a thorough understanding of the
saliency and role of contextual factors will result in easier and more reliable predictions
about how public benefits are likely to be allocated.
 These contextual factors may help the political scientist develop a matrix or
schema that can accurately reflect and predict a pattern of behavior and decisions.  These
behaviors, for example, may stem from the way a mayor sees her role in the community,
how she perceives the economic well-being of her community, how she assesses the
needs and wants of her political counterparts, city size, and the form of government she
serves.  Ultimately, these factors will prove instrumental in predicting the way mayors or
other elected officials at the local level distribute government benefits.
Organization of Dissertation
The chapters that follow support my argument that an expanded distributed
politics model by focusing on the demand-side considerations of grant allocations (Stein
1981), which considers a variety of contextual factors, such as city size, form of
government and race, better explains the behaviors and allocation decision of local
elected leaders.  This model is tested through the use of case studies and personal
interviews and through the quantitative examination of the empirical data of all CDBG
11
entitlement cities.  Chapter 2 presents the distributive politics model and the demand-side
explanation in the allocation of federal dollars, which provides the theoretical basis from
which I expand my arguments. Chapter 2 also focuses on the motivations and behaviors
of local elected officials in the decision-making process and proposes an expanded
distributive politics model by introducing a symbiotic approach that explains the
decision-making relationships among the national, local and bureaucratic stakeholders.
Chapter 3 provides a detailed overview of the Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) program by discussing the program’s history, regulations, and eligibility
requirements.  This chapter examines the devolution process of distributive benefits from
the federal government to the cities.
Chapter 4 tests the efficacy of the symbiotic model, through the case study
approach, by examining the ways cities and their mayors allocate CDBG funds.  Chapter
5 analyzes the CDBG allocations for every (758) CDBG eligible community in the
United States and the District of Columbia for the year 2001.   This analysis will examine
the impact of several variables on the dependent variable.  By examining the strength of
bivariate and multivariate relationships (through ANOVA and MANOVA), it is possible
to test the robustness of these relationships when controlled for other variables.  Chapter
6 summarizes the study’s main findings and conclusions and places them in context of
the larger literature on distributive politics theory.  This chapter also discusses the need





When asked his opinion of the national government’s practice of distributing
federal dollars to the cities, Texas Senator Phil Gramm summed up his position this way:
“if the federal government decides to build a cheese factory on the moon, [I] would
naturally be opposed to such a project, but if built, [I] would want a Texas firm to do the
engineering [and] I would want to use milk from Texas cows” (Barrett 1997, 6).  Put
another way, if federal money is to be given to the cities and states, Senator Gramm is
most concerned that his constituents from Texas benefit, either directly or indirectly,
from these federal dollars.  It is this type of attitude -- federal monies are available, an
elected official wants those dollars for his locality -- that serves as the cornerstone of
distributive politics theory.
According to the distributive politics model, legislators and local elected officials
allocate monies (1) to curry favor with constituents in order to get reelected; (2) to create
good public policy; and (3) to bolster their reputation and position among political
colleagues (Savage 1999).  When elected officials allocate monies to curry favors with
constituents, they are making decisions based on politics (sometimes referred to as pork-
barrel politics).  When they allocate monies to create good public policy, they are making
decisions in light of their psychological, cultural and/or ideological orientations.  When
they allocate monies to bolster their professional reputations, they are making decisions
that serve their personal beliefs and values.
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Bikers and Stein (1994) suggest that transaction costs explain the tradeoffs that
occurs in an official’s decision to allocate distributive benefits.  Transaction cost’s
consists of the decision to offer a benefit (both personal and professional) and the
opportunity costs of a decision.  Unfortunately, imperfect or incomplete information and
personal beliefs systems can and do impact the legitimacy of weighing the transaction
costs of a decision.  The implications of a particular decision or allocation will vary
according to the individual decision maker.
Traditionally, the distributive politics model focuses on decision-makers at the
national level, such as the President and Congress, and ignores the power and role of the
local participants such as the mayors and city council members.  Such a top-down and
centralized approach focuses on the perceptions of elected federal officials to explain
how and why government benefits are allocated in particular ways (Rich 1989).  My
research, which will apply the distributive politics theory to decision-makers at the local
(municipal) level, will examine each of the three distribution motivations in greater detail
and will demonstrate that these factors alone do not adequately explain allocation
decisions made by local officials.
Before addressing the inadequacies of the existing theory, one must first
understand how the traditional assumptions used to describe top-down federal award
distributions apply in the context of local officials allocating federal dollars. First, pork
barrel politics -- the allocation of federal dollars to gain political influence among
constituents -- is the most commonly applied assumption of the distributive politics
model.  Political science scholars (Dilger 1989, Rich 1989) posit that elected officials
distribute federal dollars to their constituencies in order to enhance their own personal
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visibility and support.  With pork barrel politics, public tax dollars and appropriations are
used to finance programs and projects in a specific locale or community for the sole
purpose of gaining voter support and ultimately winning reelection (Evans 2004, Bickers
and Stein 1996).  Although most people view pork barrel politics as a system by which
particular locales receive money to build a new bridge or dam, to initiate a job training
program, or to purchase a new fire truck, legislators sometimes use less concrete
enticements, such as tax policies and loopholes, to attract and secure voter favor in their
districts (Sakamoto 2001).  Just as federal lawmakers distribute resources to gain political
support, local officials allocate the federal dollars they receive for the same purposes.
Second, in addition to currying favor with voters, elected officials allocate monies
in an effort to create good public policy.  This judgment about what constitutes “good”
public policy is a reflection of the official’s psychological, cultural and ideological
orientation (Golden 2000).  The psychological perspective suggests that human behavior
is driven by emotions. The sociological perspective recognizes that “no person is an
island,” and that contextual elements such as groups, peers, and professional associations
can influence and shape an official’s behavior.  The ideological or cultural perspective
contends that an individual’s behavior reflects his or her beliefs, values or social needs,
all of which reflect an individual’s upbringing and orientation.
Motivated by a desire to develop good public policy, an elected official will
sometimes make decisions that she considers are in the best interests of the country and
her constituency.  Many times these policy decisions are made contrary to the special
interests or wishes of her constituency.  Realizing the potential consequences of an
unpopular decision, these elected officials are most concerned with doing what they
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consider “right.” When officials behave according to their beliefs and values, they are
sometimes referred to as “saints,” because the official is putting her fundamental
beliefs/values ahead of short-term reelection or other political concerns.  Typical saint
behavior occurs when elected officials decline the opportunity to accept pork for their
recipient jurisdiction (Savage 1991).
A distribution of federal dollars to bolster an elected official’s reputation and
status with voters is the third way by which elected officials make allocation decisions.
Elected officials will sometimes take a position that is unpopular with their own
constituency to accumulate and enhance their political capital for future issues that are
important to them.  By supporting an unpopular position, elected officials at both the
national and local levels may bolster their reputation and position among their political
colleagues who may ultimately help them develop the political support for future
endeavors
Demand-Side Explanation
The prevailing theory in the allocation of federal grant dollars suggests that all
recipient government agencies are equally desirous of federal aid dollars and that the
distribution of these monies has more to do with the available dollars on the supply-side,
than it does with the recipients’ capacity to request and administer federal funds on the
demand-side (Stein 1981).  Unfortunately, this supply-side theory does not take into
account the needs and motivations of the requesting agencies.  As a result, researchers
have begun to look at the demand-side perspective of federal allocations, one that
addresses the recipients’ concerns in order to enhance the traditional understanding of
federal grant allocations.
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The demand-side theory suggests that there are other variables, both social and
financial, that explain why recipient jurisdictions either apply for or refrain from seeking
federal aid.  From a social perspective, the government agency may not have the
appropriate staff or resources to adequately administer, implement or evaluate the grant.
This lack of expertise might influence a community’s desire or ability to pursue a federal
grant.  From a financial perspective, the direct and indirect costs associated with
administering a grant may be too costly for some localities to absorb.  These costs, such
as required monetary matches or the need to develop systems that track and audit data,
sometimes requires a substantial financial and human investment.  Put another way,
communities will sometimes refrain from applying for federal aid since they cannot
afford the financial and reporting expenses associated with the grant.
Interestingly, it is the smaller cities, especially distressed and economically
vulnerable areas, that are less inclined to pursue federal monies because of smaller staffs
and limited resources.  When a smaller city lacks the capacity to administer a federal
grant, an imbalance between those communities that need the allocations but fail to get
them and those less needy communities that do receive grants becomes even greater.
Recognizing that potential inequities exist between cities that have the capacity to
administer and implement a grant and those that do not, the federal government has
changed the nature of many of its grant-in-aid programs.  The original Model Cities
program was a categorical grant program; participating cities had to apply for funding for
individual projects.  In the 1970s, the program was changed from a categorical
grant program to a block grant program, which provides cities with greater autonomy and
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flexibility in project selections.  After all, who knows the needs of the city better than the
cities themselves (Dilger 1989).
Unfortunately, this sea change did not have the desired affects – alleviating
inequities in the distribution of grant dollars (Stein 1981).  Instead, as the CDBG program
demonstrates, the actual number of cities applying for block grants actually decreased
from the program’s early years. Between 1976 and 2001, the number of participating
entitlement cities dropped from 1,250 (HUD 2nd Annual Report) to less than 820
(“CDBG Matrix Website” 2005), a decrease of more than 34 percent.  This reduction
suggests that the block grant solution to increase city participation was not a panacea and
that the federal government might need to reconsider the demand-side concerns and
obstacles before making federal funding available to the cities.  These concerns are better
understood with a thorough explanation of the political economy and the role it plays in
the allocation of federal benefits.
Political Economy
The political-business cycle also plays a role in the distribution of federal dollars
by states and localities.  Just as federal politicians will sometimes manipulate the
economy prior to an election in order to raise their visibility and gain electoral support
(Tufte 1978), mayors and other local officials may manipulate the distribution of federal
monies before an election for the same reasons.  For example, within the political-
business cycle, a mayor seeking reelection may find it useful, immediately preceding the
election, to shift federal dollars from low-visibility projects that are not likely to yield a
significant political pay-off (such as winterization of homes for the poor) to higher
visibility projects that may yield greater electoral support (such as a popular street
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resurfacing program in an affluent neighborhood). The beneficiaries of the allocated
monies and consequent services are influenced to vote for her.
Cameron (1978) explains the growth of the public economy as political in nature:
the power of electoral competition is a very powerful influence of public spending.
According to Cameron, examining the relationship between politics and the public
economy will “imply that the contenders for political office alter their programs in order
to enhance their electoral appeal” (Cameron 1978, 1246).  A politically motivated official
will make the project alterations necessary to secure more funding and more services for
her own district. Commonly referred to as “pork barrel” politics, elected leaders spend
public taxpayer dollars to increase their personal visibility and popularity within their
districts or communities.
To understand the effects of pork barrel politics on policy, it is also important to
consider the internal or domestic explanatory variables such as the power of special
interest groups.  Such groups tend to be highly organized, exert political clout, and have
greater access to elected officials, allowing these interest groups considerable influence
over pork barrel allocations.  Unfortunately, the motives of these special interest groups
are not always reflective of general societal needs and attitudes.  Instead, these potentially
very influential groups represent the special interests they work for, even if those interests
are not shared by the general electorate.  Interest group pressure -- and the bigger the
membership and financial resources, the more powerful the group -- leads to unfair tax
advantages for some and pork barrel projects that can ultimately, and negatively,  impact
an entire state’s fiscal health.  For local governments, the pressures of interest groups can
be very powerful for both city-council member and the mayor.  For council members,
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especially those members elected by-district, it is imperative to have support for those
special interests that reside in their districts.  For mayor’s and council members elected
at-large, it is important to have the financial and political backing from a group that can
generate large amounts of votes and publicity.  This sentiment was conveyed most
directly by one Pittsburgh council member when asked about the importance of interest
groups for his district: “Even if I give $1,000 to a group, it still communicates a sense of
support and commitment to that organization” (Udin 2005).
Motivation of Elected Officials
The decision-making process of elected officials is a central concern of those who
study policies and how policies are developed and implemented.  The motivations of
individual players and their contemporaries, coupled with the political, economic and
social characteristics of the organizations they control, play a salient role in the policy-
making process. These decision-making processes may seem straightforward, even
simple, but to get to the root of these issues, one needs to study and apply the internal and
external influences of decision-making that are prominent in the political science
literature and apply them to the behaviors of local officials in the allocation of federal
benefits.
Self-Interest Theory
Self-interest theory considers the value of a person’s culture and motivation,
identifying preferences via an integral understanding of three areas of an official’s
background: psychological, sociological and ideological. The psychological perspective
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suggests that behavior is driven by emotions, and that an understanding of how particular
emotions influence various behaviors is essential to understanding processes of decision-
making.  The sociological perspective suggests that a person’s behavior is significantly
influenced by groups, peers, and professional associations. The ideological or cultural
perspective posits that behavior is a reflection of the beliefs and values of an individual
and that these beliefs and values are shaped during a person’s upbringing. These
background-influenced preferences share varying traits, ranging from the “ideal” to the
“quest for power” (Browning & Jacob 1964).
Not everyone believes that self-interest is the determining factor in a person’s
behavior.  Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) contend that bureaucrats operate under two
types of belief systems, deep core and policy core, neither of which derives primarily
from self-interest. These and similar concepts can be applied to a city’s mayor and
elected officials.  A deep core belief system encompasses those beliefs that are deeply
ingrained and often difficult to change.  Policy core beliefs are more amenable to change
over time, if the actors can rationalize the change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999,
122).  Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith suggest that bureaucrats, including operators, are not
driven by self-interest, but rather by commitment to a cause.
Decision and Rational Choice
By studying decision-making and rational choice theories, it is possible to explain
how and why elected local officials, namely mayors and city-council members, distribute
CDBG allocations.  Decision theory suggests that an individual unilaterally makes
decisions without considering the strategic interactions of other interested parties.  In
other words, the decision-maker makes choices based on current circumstances and the
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probability of future outcomes, without significant consideration of how other interested
parties might be involved in or might react to the individual’s decision (Humes and
Gates, 2000).  These choices are typically influenced and shaped by the individual’s own
ideological and cultural preferences.  With decision theory, the only factor that can
influence a choice other than the individual herself is an event that is beyond her control.
So, for example, a city’s mayor can decide to fund a particular project with federal
dollars, but if the federal government decides not to allocate any dollars to that city,  then
the mayor must act on an “event” that is not within her control—the event of not having
federal dollars for the project.
 According to rational choice theory, decision-makers are presumed to make well-
reasoned choices.  If choices are reasonable, the behavior of the decision-maker can make
choices with sufficient accuracy to clarify and predict the strategies and consequences of
her actions (cite).
Unfortunately, it is not always possible to determine if a decision is “logical” or
“reasonable.”  What is reasonable for one person is not necessarily reasonable for
another.  Viewpoints and attitudes tend to be subjective and contingent upon a person’s
orientation and individual belief system.  What is more problematic is that these
viewpoints are sometimes reinforced by a person’s personal or professional associations.
When an individual surrounds himself with like-thinkers, his decision-making process is
not likely to take into account individuals who hold differing viewpoints or offer
competing advice. If a policy-making individual surrounds himself with only those who
share his views, “logic” and “reason” can come to mean the beliefs, values and
motivations of only that select group.
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Internal Influences
Steinmo (1992) believes that culture is an important determinant of decision-
making, but that the context of a particular time is the most influential factor in
establishing a definition of relevant “culture,” Steinmo (1992) believes that a person’s
world view is shaped by a person’s most recently significant life experiences, and not
necessarily by those lessons learned in early childhood.  For example, events like 9/11 or
Hurricane Katrina can and do have a substantial impact on officials’ policy-making
processes.  Analysts such as Steinmo argue that culture and a person’s attitudes change
according to the experiences and events in a person’s life, rather than being unwaveringly
dependent on lessons taught early on by parents and family.
When an official makes a decision that is based on her own sense of what is
appropriate and best, but that decision is contrary to the values or desires of a particular
sector of the citizenry, a divided public can result and the elected official is faced with the
need to balance the interests of various groups and what she believes is appropriate.
Whenever a democracy possesses a rich mixture of diverse and opposing viewpoints, the
development of decisions amicable to all -- including to the elected officials who believe
in the social significance of doing what they, themselves, view as “right thing” -- is
difficult to achieve.
External Influences
The external influences on a mayor’s decision-making processes are many:
bureaucracies, constituents, media, interest groups, and action-channels all can affect a
mayor’s actions and decisions. Regardless of the decision to be made, it is almost certain
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that some external person or group will attempt to shape an outcome to his, her or its
advantage.  In other words, the relationships that are forged between the external
influences and the mayors will help determine the behaviors and actions of a mayor’s
decision-making process.
Bureaucracy
Two important elements of a mayor’s power are his appointment of important
players to key positions and his direct or indirect control of the city budget and “purse
strings.”  A mayor can directly order budget cuts and he can reassign departmental
responsibilities, which allows him to effectively both alter departmental budgets and to
bestow or rescind powerful departmental positions. With such budgetary and bureaucratic
powers in his hand, a mayor can exert substantial control over the behaviors and policies
of a city’s operating departments and the distribution of federal dollars -- ultimately
impacting the decision-making process.
Another way mayors gain support for their decision and program allocations is
through agent buy-in.  This is frequently done with both monetary and non-monetary
rewards.  Like any elected officials, mayors tend to be more successful in controlling an
organization if they can gain an agent’s trust and support.   Since agents become powerful
specialists in knowing and running their organizations, and, therefore in implementing
their organization’s policy, their buy-in and support is imperative for the principal that
seeks to control an organization and its actions.   This buy-in is especially salient for
mayors in their implementation of CDBG strategies and goals.  By having a loyal
organization that understands and supports a program’s rules and regulations, and that
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has established solid bonds with agencies such as HUD, a mayor can increase the
likelihood that his goals and objectives will be met.  In other words, the shared values of
the organization’s actors can play a large role in determining the outcomes of a mayor’s
policy goals and objectives.
Regardless of the policy program, the elected official must understand the
orientation and values of policy stakeholders in differing contexts.  Notwithstanding the
policy track, policies evolve and result from the beliefs and value systems of the
community at a particular place and time.  Whether a policy is influenced by peer support
systems, deep core beliefs, special interest groups, politicians, or partisan politics, a
policy maker must be cognizant of both the internal and external variables that influence
policy.
Each time a new mayor assumes office, the elected official must make a decision
about whether she can work with existing operators or should recruit new operators.
Before a decision can be made, principals must identify those employees who are loyal or
will become loyal to the organization.  Otherwise, the behavior or actions of ambivalent
or disloyal operators can sabotage or threaten an official’s objectives.   Assessing the way
an operator interprets policy and behaves or will behave, however, can be difficult at
best.  The official must understand that she is dealing with a person’s culture and belief
system and that people tend to be resistant to change.  Elected officials must also realize
that they are dealing with organizational constraints such as civil service rules and
regulations that can impact their ability to manage or shape the organization.  However,
through pecuniary and nonpecuniary rewards, and through an understanding of factors
that affect a willingness (or unwillingness) to alter behavior, a principal can be successful
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in achieving a significant level of cooperation and compliance within a city’s bureaucracy
(Brehm and Gates 1997).  The ability to understand the organizational rules and
regulations, as well as the operator’s behaviors, is salient for the elected officials so they
can achieve the goals that are important to them.  In the case of CDBG allocations, these
goals include getting bureaucrats to fund “pet” projects and receiving credit from their
constituency.
Constituents
Like all elected officials, a city’s mayor and its council members understand that
their constituents are the ultimate judge of their behavior and that these constituents
participate in the political process in many ways.  They participate through silence, they
participate through groups, and they participate by running for elected office themselves.
People who feel strongly about an issue can participate in the political process through
interest groups, referenda and direct intervention. Elected officials understand that a
constituent’s decision to pursue a particular direction or action in the political process
will have a profound impact on the way other constituents perceive and consequently
involve themselves in the policy process.
In order to understand why a person or constituent participates the way she does,
it is important to understand a person’s belief systems, cultural influences, biases and
attitudes.  While personality characteristics are important determinants in understanding
how a person participates in the political process, there are other determinative factors
such as issue saliency, class divisions, state of the economy and the leadership qualities
of competent and skillful bureaucrats.  These considerations play an important role in
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determining who becomes involved in policy-making activities, and in how a person
would choose to participate in the political and policy process.
A person’s class background or social origins are essential elements in her
decision to participate in the political process.  These decisions are also influenced by a
person’s conscious or unconscious engagement with sociological and ideological
perspectives.  Jones (2001) argues that the sociological perspective recognizes that “no
person is an island,” and that groups, peers, and professional associations can influence
and shape behavior (Jones 2001, 197). It follows, then, that a person’s decision to
participate in policy-making is at least somewhat dependent on the groups with which she
identifies and associates. An ideological or cultural perspective contends that a person’s
choices are a reflection of her beliefs, and that these beliefs are formed during an
individual’s upbringing and cultural orientation. Thus, a person’s decision about the
nature of her participation in policy-making processes is influenced by a lifetime of
experiencing the beliefs and actions of her family and cultural community.
Exercising the right to vote can be considered participation through silence.  A
person who votes may not be publicly vocal in her beliefs or may not directly participate
in political or policy-making processes; rather she “silently” casts her vote, in this way
acting on her values and making her beliefs “heard.”   In extreme cases, people will
silently vote “with their feet”; a voter may be so concerned with local policies and elected
leaders that she will physically relocate to another state or locality in “silent” protest of
local policies and officials.
  When a person participates through a group, she provides financial assistance to
or joins a special interest group or organization that supports the person or policy she
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believes in or that works against what she considers to be an undesirable person or policy.
Rather than “taking matters into her own hands,” a person can support or join an interest
group that has sufficient resources and members to sway the opinion of a political
candidate or policy-maker.  The collective voice of such a group sends a powerful
message to lawmakers and politicians alike; thus political participation via contributing to
or belonging to groups can have a significant effect on policy.
Referenda and direct intervention are other ways that the citizenry can participate
in the political process.  These tools allow an individual to question and change an
existing policy that she perceives as being unfair.  By seeking a change via referendum,
an individual can participate in government in a powerful and meaningful way.
According to Kinder and Kiewiet’s (1981) article on sociotropic politics,
individuals participate in the political process based on how they are doing economically.
This self-interest perspective is based on the overall state of the economy, from both a
national and personal perspective of the economy as well as the overall prosperity of their
family.  In other words, individual’s measure economic performance based on their
personal situation coupled with national economic climate.  Kinder and Kiewiet believe
that individual’s pursue this self-serving behavior since it is the most effective way that
voter’s can serve their best interests (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981).
Media
Mayors are influenced by the media and the awareness levels raised by media
practices and outlets.  Media coverage has considerable power to raise the general
public’s awareness of particular issues at particular times.  The media decides which
stories to run, which stories to make a big deal about, and which stories to dwell upon
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(Powlick and Katz 1998).  In other words, the media can be an extremely powerful
external force in activating public opinion and shaping the policy conclusions that are
reached by the general public and the mayors (Hermann, Tetlock and Visser 1999).  As
Baker and O’Neal (2001) point out, the media’s power and influence cannot be
discounted and can sometimes mislead the public to inaccurate conclusions.  Since the
press does not always have access to the same information that a mayor or elected
officials do, the media might portray an issue or behavior in misleading and inaccurate
ways.  As a result, a mayor or other public official is sometimes forced to deal with the
added burden of responding to a manipulated or factually misinformed public.
Conversely, the media can have a positive effect on a constituent’s perception of an
official, an issue or policy decision by bringing these issues to the public’s attention.
  With the advent of twenty-four hour news coverage, the Internet and other
features of the information age, a mayor’s decision-making processes and actions are
available for scrutiny as never before.  The results of such information availability can
allow for undue media influence on politics, but such ease of access also allows for
potentially increased citizen participation, “silent,” or otherwise, in the political and
policy-making processes.
Overall, the power of the media can have both positive and negative
consequences for a mayor.  On the plus side, the media can foster support for a mayor’s
policy decisions.  On the negative side, the media can shape public attitudes that are
hostile to the mayor’s policy outcomes and goals.  Whatever the repercussions, the media
serves as a powerful tool that, by providing information in particular ways to the general
public, can influence the decision-making choices of the mayor.
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Interest Groups
Interest group influence is yet another external influence that shapes the behavior
of a mayor.  Since some groups have vast financial resources or staffs that can gather
important data or statistics, their power can, consequently, be substantial.  By
contributing large amounts of money or support to a legislator, a special interest group
can have a profound impact on how that legislator makes and implements a policy
decision.
Unfortunately, some stakeholders exert more influence than others. The
politically powerful and financially secure interest groups, for example, tend to wield
more influence in the policy-making process since their presence and visibility is high.
Although there are several kinds of interest groups in the American political system (such
as economic, social policy, public interest, labor unions, and ideologically based groups),
interest groups have the power to influence public policy in many ways.  When groups
give money to a particular candidate, they hope to elect a person that is sympathetic to
their cause.  Interest groups, by contributing money or supporting a candidate, hope to
gain better access to the candidates and organize lobbying efforts to persuade elected
officials to support or oppose those issues that are important to them.  As a result, mayors
must be cognizant of these influences and powers.
Action-Channels
Action-channels “are decision-making processes which describe the participation
of actors and their influences” (Krasner 1972).  Action-channels describe the influences
that drive an actor’s decisions.  For instance, understanding that major players within an
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organization, such as trusted advisors have the “ear” of the mayor allows the action-
channel to play a pivotal role in influencing an actor’s decisions.  In other words, an
action-channel is an exchange between a bureaucrat, organization, or private person.
This exchange can have a profound impact on a policy-making decision.
In the allocation of CDBG dollars, the action-channels could be affluent
constituents demanding that federal benefits be used to further enhance their own
neighborhoods.  Knowing that these constituents are likely to offer financial and political
support for future elections, mayors will be more inclined to pay close attention to the
alleged needs of these constituents.
Subsystems
 As the internal and external influences have shown, it is not enough to simply
explain that a particular CDBG allocation decision was made.  Rather we need to
understand how and why a particular decision was made.  Through the study of policy
subsystems, legislators, administrative agencies and interest groups work behind the
scenes to secure the adoption, protection and expansion of distributive programs and
projects (Bickers and Stein, p. 589).
Symbiotic Approach to the Distributive Politics Model
Symbiotic Approach
There has been much criticism about pork barrel spending.  Many people believe
that federal tax dollars should be earmarked for national priorities such as Social Security
or AIDS research.  Locale-specific improvements, such as a bridge reconstruction project
in West Virginia, offer little benefit to taxpayers in Iowa.   Whether or not it is ethical and
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legitimate to use federal tax dollars for project-specific applications has been highly
debated.  Since elections turn on serving the needs and wants of the electorate, elected
officials at the federal and local levels can be put to a difficult choice: allocate federal
money toward legitimate federal and local social needs or allocate money to projects that
increase the officials’ visibility and favor among a particular group of voters. These
choices are better explained through the application of a symbiotic approach – one that
encourages officials and bureaucrats at the national and local level to satisfy each others
needs.
According to Rich (1989), the distribution of federal monies is a two-way street in
that the federal legislators give local bureaucrats flexibility in spending, and the local
bureaucrats make certain that the federal legislators receive credit for enabling local
projects.  In this scenario, both the legislators and bureaucrats are benefiting from federal
grant money -- local bureaucrats implement more projects and federal legislators claim
credit for ‘pushing’ a grant award through the bureaucracy. In other words, legislators
and national government leaders are content to allow recipient jurisdictions and their
elected officials to pick and choose those individual projects they wish to fund as long as
these legislators and national government leaders can claim credit for the many diverse
projects funded with federal government dollars.
Rich’s two-way street analogy can be extended to include the bureaucrats and
elected officials at both the national and local levels.  In this symbiotic scenario, the
distribution of federal benefits is contingent upon a delicate balance among policy makers
and elected officials at the national and local levels.  At the national level, the elected
decision-makers are the legislators.  These principals help lobby for funding, help
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determine eligibility formulas and expedite award decisions.  The bureaucratic officials
(e.g., HUD) at the national level are charged with the responsibility of program
implementation and oversight.  At the local level, the elected decision-makers are the
mayors and city-council members.  Although these elected officials have geographically
differing motivations, these actors have an interest in allocating or reallocating a portion
of the total federal entitlement dollars to their “pet projects.”  At the bureaucratic level,
the primary decision-makers are the bureaucrats or program administrators who
administer and implement the federal allocations.  These bureaucrats are more concerned
with keeping their principals satisfied than with challenging the principals about where
and how federal money should be spent, although those in bureaucratic positions often try
to do what they perceive to be right (Golden 2000, 21) and to do the best that they can do
(Lipsky 1980, 81).  By playing the role of conciliator among their principals, bureaucrats
“cope with their impossible jobs quite ingeniously and imaginatively” (Hargrove and
Glidewell 1990, 4), while trying to maintain program autonomy, compliance and personal
job security.
“When a program depends on so many actors, there are numerous possibilities for
disagreement and delay” (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973, 102), resulting in disagreement
and/or conflict in the administration of the national program.  As Figure 1 indicates, the
elected principals at the national-level will expedite award dollars through the federal
bureaucracy in exchange for acknowledgement from the elected local-level officials. In
turn, the elected local-level officials will provide program autonomy at the bureaucratic-
level providing they find a way to fund their “pet projects” with the federal dollars.  The
local-level officials at the bureaucratic level are eager to provide professional program
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management as long as the national-level bureaucrats relax the oversight process.
Finally, the national-level bureaucrats will strive to comply with the program’s rules and
regulations in the hopes that the elected national-level officials provide them with some
autonomy in the administration of the program.
The distributive nature of this symbiotic approach “can be conceived of as a
system in which each element is dependent on the other” (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973,
xv). Only when all four levels (national-bureaucratic, national-elected, local-bureaucratic,
and local-elected) are satisfied that their needs are being met can the elected officials and
bureaucrats work in harmony.    In short, a sense of trust and confidence in one another
occurs when each level of elected official and bureaucrat does what the other desires.
This symbiotic or mutually beneficial approach to distributive politics suggests that each
programming level feeds off the other so that the distribution of federal monies can run
smoothly.
An Economic Model of Supply and Demand
The symbiotic model in Figure 2.1 has many characteristics of an economic
model with a supply and demand perspective.  On the supply side, federal CDBG dollars
are provided to entitlement cities in the form of grants.  The federal legislature
appropriates the monies with stipulated general guidelines and requirements and the
entitlement cities determine how and for what purposes these grant dollars will be used.
Despite the limitations placed on these federal dollars, eligible localities enjoy a high
degree of flexibility and freedoms in allocating these monies.
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Another supply side determinant involves the level of professionalism involved in
administering and implementing federal grants.  Not all entitlement cities maintain the
same resources, potential or expertise for grant management.  This lack of parity creates
vast inequities in obtaining grants, allowing some cities to seek grant dollars that others
may not have the staff or expertise to pursue. Cities with a large tax base, are more
inclined to hire professionally educated staffers that can assist in the grant procurement
process.  Such large tax bases and the resulting staffing opportunities are typically related
to the size and wealth of a city.
The amount of discretion an entitlement community exerts in the grant allocation
process is another supply side consideration.  Because of the physical distance from the
federal policy makers who set the general CDBG guidelines, recipient jurisdictions
maintain a level of “freedoms” to develop specific projects that may or may not be in the
intended spirit of the grant.  Localities will use this “physical distance” consideration as a
means of supporting projects that are deemed, by local politicians and administrators, to
be most important to the recipient jurisdiction.  If a city’s grant administrators are
proficient at reporting to and complying with the federal government, they are less
inclined to be questioned on their spending activities.  Entitlement cities that have a
history of questionable reporting activities will, however, be monitored more closely.
From a demand side perspective, the federal government imposes certain
expectations on recipient jurisdictions to which those jurisdictions are expected to adhere
-- namely the ability to support and follow the rules and regulations of the federal grant.
In essence, these expectations require “a relationship of mutual trust and obligation”
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Figure 2.1                                      Symbiotic Approach
                                                    to
                                 Distributive Politics Theory
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(Pitkin 1967, 129) and that local officials will distribute their appropriations in the spirit
in which they were intended.
National legislators, namely members of Congress, maintain an expectation that
they will be acknowledged or “receive credit” for their efforts to secure grant monies for
their local constituents.  Typically, elected officials at the local levels are more than
happy to comply with this tacit expectation, providing that the national legislators do
actually come through with CDBG monies for the localities.  In fact, both federal and
local elected officials frequently strive to be acknowledged for these federal outlays, but
for different reasons: federal legislators want to gain national exposure for the projects
they support; local politicians hope to garner ongoing voter approval and support for
proposed and completed local improvement projects.
Being responsive to local interests and to the electorate is another demand side
issue associated with federal CDBG allocations.  Since elected officials at the national
and local levels are continuously concerned with reelection (Mayhew 1979), they are
extremely alert to the types of projects they might fund and extremely aware of the
publicity that these projects generate.  Demand side analysis shows, then, that the desire
to make “good policy” stems from not only from politicians’ and legislators’ personal
values and belief systems, but also from their political ambitions.
 In sum, the relationship between the supply-demand model and the symbiotic
model share many commonalities: flexibility, acknowledgement, and responsiveness.
Grant dollars are allocated to the localities and the allocation decisions are made
according to the capacity of that city to administer the grant effectively and efficiently.  It
is this lack of capacity, unfortunately, that differentiates the supply-demand model from
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the symbiotic model.  With the symbiotic model, each entity is dependent upon the other
for the successes and failures of a program.  With the supply and demand model, the
assumption that entities are dependent upon one another is not relevant.  Therefore, the
supply and demand model does not consider an organizations lack of professionalism or
capacity administer a grant.
National-Level Officials
National legislators are rewarded, not punished, for allocating pork to cities
(Kelly 1993).  These rewards translate into high visibility among their legislative
colleagues, in the media and among the general public. The distribution of federal
benefits gives legislators a nonpartisan way to gain electoral support from their districts
(Mayhew 1979).  Distributive politics permits national legislators to pursue their self-
interested electoral goals with the tacit blessing of other legislators, regardless of benefit
or differences (Bickers and Stein 1996).  This school of thought holds that if any one
member receives federal pork, then a majority of the members must receive pork too
(Evans 1994).
Often referred to as universalism, legislators distribute benefits for purposes of
securing credit and positive attention for themselves, without caring about who receives
the federal monies they have facilitated and without ongoing concern for how these funds
are used (Balla et al. 2002).  The logic behind this broad-based support is that, as long as
no one objects to the entire package, everyone benefits from his share of the “pie.”  These
interactions of who gets what, when and how are central to the study of politics and
decision-making.
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Even if federal pork is unevenly dispensed, legislators are not inclined to oppose
its distribution since most localities receive some pork. Legislators believe that the
goodwill realized by distributing federal benefits to specific localities not directly
associated with them will yield residual effects that may be even more important to the
legislators’ visibility and reputation (Fenno 1978), is better to support and receive some
distribution rather than opposing all pork benefits and risk the possibility of receiving no
distribution (Evans 1994). One notable exception to this laissez-faire attitude is the
infamous ‘bridge to nowhere’ controversy in Ketchikan, Alaska.  This $200 million
dollar, federally funded double span bridge, rising more than 200 feet above ocean level,
will be built to serve a small island with an average population of 50 residents.  Despite
Republican Don Young’s argument that this project will create significant economic
development and employment opportunities for the region, there has been extensive
criticism of this ‘pork’ project from the legislators and electorate alike.
Weingast offers an example of how federal monies used for one locale can be of
benefit to other constituencies and areas (Weingast 1994). Weingast explains that a $10
million dollar dam project can assist multiple communities.  The construction and site can
help one city, while the agricultural benefits and environmental interests are beneficial to
another locale.  Likewise, a highway project in Pennsylvania will indirectly assist the
trucking industry in West Virginia by providing better roads and easier access to certain
destinations.  Because these benefits affect multiple districts or communities, and since
the monies to pay for these benefits are provided by national, rather than local, taxes,
there tends to be minimal opposition at both the federal and local levels.
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Unfortunately, not all pork can be divided or distributed in ways that benefit
communities and constituencies outside an immediate recipient area.  As a result, there is
a concern that federal allocations will be distributed to high profile areas or highly
competitive districts where legitimate challengers could pose a threat.  Therefore,
strategic allocation decisions must be made to determine which communities are to
receive the lion’s share of federal benefits and which communities receive the indirect
benefits of the distribution.
Because distributive benefits are so closely tied to a local official’s electoral
interests, legislators tend to allocate federal dollars to localities for projects that are
doable within an electoral cycle.   Legislators intentionally fund projects for the short-
term so that they can claim credit every benefit every time money is awarded.  In other
words, a $40 million dollar bridge project can foster a huge amount of support and
visibility, but once the publicity and “hoopla” is over, the legislator will begin searching
for and facilitating the next pork project for which he can claim credit.
Beside the electoral concerns, a federal legislator will frequently commit federal
monies to smaller projects in case the need arises for shifting support from one local
project or official to another.  In the event the national legislator decides to change her
support, the legislator has federal pork dollars available to fund other projects.  In short, a
legislator does not want to commit to a large allocation unless she is confident that the
recipient jurisdiction and local elected official will significantly contribute to her winning
reelection (Bickers and Stein 1996).
National legislators often allocate federal grants to reward local officials for their
past support.  This support is necessary to achieve recognition and publicity for the
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national legislator’s hard work on behalf of a local populace and to further a legislator’s
personal agenda or the agenda of the President. When federal monies or pork are
allocated to the localities for the projects and programs that directly benefit local
officials, local officials are less inclined to resist those programs that are most important
to the national legislators.
Federal legislators also have the capacity and power to expedite reward requests,
and are likely to do so when such expedition coincides with a local official’s election
process.  Using their extensive personal and professional contacts and their ability to
efficiently navigate federal bureaucracies, national leaders will sometimes accelerate or
delay federal grant announcement so that their political colleagues at the local level can
benefit.  Put another way, in exchange for support of a legislator’s personal agenda, she
may strategically schedule a benefit or “pork” award to assist a local elected official’s
reelection campaign (Evans 2004).
Local-Level Officials
For local elected officials, federal benefits represent a means to satisfy campaign
promises, achieve visibility, obtain constituent support and get reelected, all without
raising local taxes or tapping local coffers.   The structure of grants such as the federal
Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) allows local officials to apply federal
monies to a variety of projects deemed useful by those local elected officials.  Projects
located in more affluent neighborhoods where voters tend to be politically active are at
least as likely to be funded as projects in high-need, low-income neighborhoods. More
affluent, active, visible voters may be involved in high-powered interest groups that want
infrastructure or other indirect benefits for their neighborhoods.  Whatever the reason,
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local officials understand that by satisfying the needs of the special interests and
community groups, they can continue to allocate the majority of the federal grant money
to those projects that the local officials consider appropriate within the spirit of the
federal distribution limits.   By studying the politics involved in making decision, it is
possible to gain a better understanding of the distribution of power within a locality or
organization.  A detailed examination of how and why elected local leaders distribute
federal dollars and make funding decisions will be discussed in the next chapter.
Bureaucratic-Level Officials (National & Local)
At the bureaucratic-level, the bureaucrat is responsible for the administration and
implementation of the federal benefits.  Specifically, she manages the administration of
the federal dollars, including contract management, labor compliance and fiscal
operations; develops and implements approved policies, goals and priorities for the
allocation of funds; oversees grant sub-recipient application processing and eligibility
determinations; and oversees the federal auditing process (“Community Development
Program Supervisor Job Description” 1995).  As an agent for the mayor and city-council,
the bureaucrat must mediate and undertake the very difficult requirements of distributing
the federal dollars while balancing the demands of political and elected leaders,
supervisors, the citizenry, and the needs and desires of interest groups.  In other words,
given the scope of the bureaucrat’s job and the various offices and people she must
satisfy, it becomes nearly impossible for her to successfully act upon all demands and
intentions (Hargrove and Glidewell 1990).
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To successfully satisfy the demands of their jobs, the bureaucrats must make
decisions that are consistent with their values and beliefs while being sensitive and
responsive to the needs of their bosses, while being sensitive to the politics of the
organization and decision-making groups of the locality.  Having the flexibility to make
their own decisions can have an impact on the officials to whom they report.  As Lipsky
explains, “it is the discretionary role of street-level bureaucrats and their position as de
facto policymakers that critically affect managers’ dependence upon their subordinates”
Lipsky 1980, 24).  These de facto policies can and do determine the nature and level of
exposure or publicity the national and local-level elected officials obtain.
Monitoring bureaucratic performance through executive oversight is difficult to
manage for a host of reasons, ranging from the size of the local agency involved to the
quality and professionalism of personnel at the federal oversight agency.  In the CDBG
context, the federal agency with oversight responsibility is the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD).  HUD may have difficulty monitoring large cities that
receive fifty million entitlement dollars, for example, because of the quantity of programs
and projects funded.  To thoroughly audit each and every federally-funded project would
be too cumbersome and inefficient for the federal auditor.  As a result, cities must be
trusted to “do the right thing” and spend the federal dollars in accordance with their
intended purposes (Kettl 1980).
To maintain control and oversight of local spending, federal officials have come
to rely upon “whistle blowers” to keep them informed about a recipient city’s activities.
Known as “fire alarms,” elected officials rely on interest groups, lobbyists and program
recipients to keep tabs on agency activities (Mitnick 1984, 15).  Elected officials know
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that these “agency watchdogs” will not hesitate to report improprieties to the appropriate
body should a perceived conflict occur.  In other words, interest groups, active
community organizations and citizens alike are used to monitor an agency’s activities.
This practice allows HUD and local-level officials to concentrate on tasks (such as the
administration of the CDBG program or dealing with constituents) more immediately
important to their function while keeping their bureaucratic agencies and associated
support staff accountable.  Without these “fire alarm” safeguards, the officials at the
national and local-level would be far less aware of agents’ behaviors and would be forced
to rely upon the perceptions or preferences of their own support staff for assessment of
agencies’ integrity and effectiveness.
Elections and Incumbency
Incumbents for political office at the national and local levels have distinct
advantages over their opponents in their ability to manipulate the federal dollars that are
made available to them.  With the ultimate goal of reelection in mind (Mayhew 1979),
distributive benefits are sometimes offered to local officials because of their potential for
high visibility and popular projects, and are frequently awarded to entitlement
communities just before a local official’s reelection bid (Stein 1996).  This timing is not
coincidental.  Election years usually translate into an increase in the distribution of
federal dollars or pork that is sometimes used as a tool to help the incumbent candidate at
the local level win reelection.  This is done by announcing grant awards immediately
before an election, speeding up the processing of grant applications and by recognizing
the local official for her hard work in securing the federal benefit (Anagnoson 1982).
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Incumbent candidates at both the national and local levels hope that the residual
effects of distributed benefits will leave their constituents with an overall positive
impression of their hard work and dedication.  The goal, according to Tufte (1978), is that
the positive feelings of the general public towards the incumbent’s distribution of these
federal dollars will translate into votes and, ultimately, reelection.  Besides the obvious
advantages of being an incumbent seeking reelection, such as franking privileges, size of
staff and visible community activities, incumbents have the use of federal dollars to boost
their image and popularity among their constituencies.  The initiation and completion of
high-profile projects, financed via federal pork barrel dollars, increase the probability that
local officials will be successful in future elections (Bickers and Stein 1996). On the
other hand, if a national legislator believes that an incumbent official at the local level is
so behind in the polls or is so irreparably involved in controversy that a reelection victory
is uncertain, then a reduction of pork may result.   Because national legislators want to be
associated with successful local candidates and since national legislators want to back
local-level officials who will support their goals and objectives, a national legislator may
ut her losses if she perceives the incumbent to be losing popularity and appeal among her
constituents.
Interest Groups Influences
The influence of interest groups on the symbiotic model is shaped by the sheer
number of special interests.   Because of the sheer volume of interest groups, the impact
on the symbiotic model can be minimal.  Legislators no longer feel obligated to one
particular group since they do not represent a large block of support and no longer pose a
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viable threat to a politician’s job security.  Therefore the consensus among legislators is
that they will not be held hostage or intimidated into supporting a particular piece of
legislation (Lowery and Gray 1995).
On the other hand, the power of money can play a large role in influencing an
official’s decisions.  An interest group with strong financial resources can lobby
independently, and does not need to negotiate with association members or partners, but
can deliver its own undiluted message to legislators.  Interest groups with fewer resources
may be compelled to share the costs of retaining a lobbyist and may have to compromise
their positions to achieve a shared lobbying agenda.  If competing interest groups share
the same lobbyist, then each group’s position may become compromised.
The influence or lack of influence of an interest group shapes the preferences of
local-level elected officials due to economic, political and social reasons.    Economic
based on the wealth of the interest group, political due to the clout and influence of a
group and social related to a group’s inherent value and belief systems.
Expanding the Distributive Politics Model and Demand-Side Explanation
Although the current literature on the distributive politics model and demand-side
explanation in the allocation of federal grant dollars might help explain how and why
local officials distribute federal dollars as they do, it fails to address a host of other
factors that also influence these decisions.  This study will examine a number of these
influences including the motivation and behavior of mayors, as well as the contextual
factors -- including the size of city, form of government, wealth of city, geographical
region, political affiliation of administration and incumbency -- in an effort to better
explain allocation decisions made by mayors.  In other words, policy makers or scholars
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know a great deal about the “supply-side” of grants as a way of alleviating potential
inequities in the allocation process, but know far less about the “demand-side” in the
administration, implementation and evaluation of federal aid monies (Stein 1981).  These
“demand-side” concerns are shaped by the context in which they occur, for both present
and future exchanges in the allocation process.
As a case study to illustrate the efficacy of these contextual factors in explaining
allocation decisions, this research will examine the CDBG program, a federal program
that supports state and municipal programs and projects. The federal CDBG program
serves as an excellent vehicle for testing an expanded distributive politics model and
demand-side explanation for two reasons.  First, as long as a city meets the population
requirement, it will be eligible for federal CDBG monies with very few qualifications or
requirements.  Basically, the federal government devolves CDBG funds to state and local
governments irrespective of a locale’s tax basis, geographic region or community
politics.  Given the general availability of CDBG monies and the enormous flexibility
cities enjoy in distributing these funds, this program provides an excellent opportunity to
study how and why government benefits are allocated.  Second, the federal government
maintains detailed data on the CDBG program, which permits careful analysis of the role
that the contextual factors play in the allocation of federal dollars.
Conclusion
To say that decisions are made unilaterally and that the decision-making process
is not affected by both internal and external factors would be to underestimate the
complexity of decision-making and to dismiss the importance of the many internal and
external variables that help predict outcomes. Whatever the apparent strengths or powers
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of elected officials, for these people to be truly effective, there must be a shared
understanding between them and all the players who influence them.  In other words,
special interests, media, and the general public can, in many ways and in many
combinations, play significant roles in the decisions that may, on the surface, appear to be
produced by the elected officials themselves.
 By examining the how federal dollars are allocated to the localities, specifically
the “demand-side” perspective where the social and financial considerations are taken
into account, will help explain variation in the way cities distribute CDBG monies.  Put
another way, this study will identify a linkage between the motivations of mayors, the
political implications of decision-making, as well as the social and financial implications




The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program
Introduction
On August 22, 1974, President Gerald Ford signed into law the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, which consolidated into one comprehensive
program, the Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG), seven preexisting
categorical grants, including urban renewal, model cities, housing code enforcement,
neighborhood facilities, water and sewer development, and historical preservation (Dilger
1989).  Currently, more than $5 billion annually (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development 2003) in federal dollars is distributed nationwide through CDBG, with the
majority of these dollars allocated through the use of a formula system (Dommel 1980).
The program’s goals are to expand economic opportunities, improve the overall living
conditions and address specific areas of need, particularly for those of low and moderate
income (“Code of Federal Regulations” 2003).  At the time of its creation, the CDBG
program was seen as an important part of a new federalism that was sweeping the nation
as various significant powers were shifted from the federal government to the local
communities (Rich 1993). The CDBG program continues to evince the federal
government’s genuine commitment to cities and neighborhoods, and the program enjoys
bipartisan support from Congress.
The CDBG program evolved from the Kennedy administration’s commitment to
the War on Poverty or Model Cities program.  The CDBG program was designed to
allow decision-makers at the local level, who are inherently more knowledgeable about
and responsive to their community’s needs than is the national government (Pratt Institute
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Center for Community and Environmental Development 2001), the flexibility to finance
projects that are more consistent with the community’s needs. This “hands off” approach
gave more discretion and power to the local governments in the allocation and spending
of federal community improvement dollars (Nathan 1983).
 The CDBG program established a shift or devolution of the control of resources
from the federal government to the cities’ administrators and office-holders.  Previously,
Congress or federal agencies made categorical grants available to local governments on a
project-by-project basis, giving the federal bureaucracy much more power and control in
the project approval process and ensuring that local governments used federal dollars
consistent with the federal agencies’ priorities and directives (Dilger 1989).  Under
CDBG, the rigid guidelines regarding project type, implementation and assessment
imposed by the federal government on localities were loosened, and the project-by-
project approval process was no longer required. As long as the CDBG guidelines were
met, cities could implement the projects and programs of their choice. The CDBG
program, then, allowed those officials who lived in a community to determine the
community’s most pressing needs. The shift from federal to local decision-making also
reflected the belief that local officials could and should be more accountable for the
actual uses of federal monies granted to communities. This heightened local
accountability brought local officials, in turn, to suggest that since the public held them
accountable for their project selections at election time, they should play a larger role in
deciding which projects would be implemented (Kettl 1980).
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HUD Regulations
According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), CDBG
monies can be used for a variety of projects to improve housing, public buildings, green
spaces, transportation and job opportunities.  Projects ranging from street resurfacing to
playground rehabilitation to workforce training are eligible for federal dollars.
Unfortunately, as accountability has shifted to the served localities, guidelines for
expenditures and assessment have evolved into vague or ambiguous criteria or standards
that allow local officials to increase their own power without necessarily “expanding
economic opportunities, improving the overall living conditions and addressing specific
areas of need, particularly for those of low and moderate income” (Consolidated
Community Development Plan for the City of Pittsburgh 2002). CDBG funds are
sometimes spent throughout an entire community, rather than in those areas of greatest
immediate need.  It is not unheard of for a city to use CDBG monies to construct a
marina or tennis courts in an affluent neighborhood (Kettl 1980), while roads, bridges, or
substandard public areas, especially in low-income neighborhoods, remain unimproved.
Because the program guidelines are so flexible, program administrators who
report to, for instance, the mayor of a municipality have immense freedom to fund
whichever projects they want that will reflect well on the mayor.  These grants allow
elected local leaders, such as mayors, to boast about community improvements that did
not require any local tax dollars. The flexibility that allows CDBG monies to be well used
by knowledgeable officials for genuine and immediate local needs can also allow for
problematic appropriation of funds by officials who want to secure power via their
freedom to address the desires of various influential constituencies.  Therefore, it is
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important to question the distributive policies of the CDBG program at the local level to
see if the program goals, as defined by HUD, are being met consistently over time, both
legally and in spirit.
According to CDBG regulations promulgated by HUD, if an affluent
neighborhood borders a low to moderate-income community, then the poorer community
can benefit from an improvement in the affluent neighborhood (Code of Federal
Regulations 2003).  The rationale is that the residents of the poorer community can take
advantage of the improvement in the affluent neighborhood.  Under these circumstances,
an expenditure in an affluent neighborhood may well be considered permissible under
CDBG guidelines.  The final result of these improvements is that the affluent community
is pleased to be getting a glitzy new facility and the poorer community is happy to have
access to such a facility within walking distance.  It could be argued, though, that if the
CDBG regulations were written more tightly, then the glitzy new facility would have
been located in the low-to-moderate-income neighborhood.  The improvement would
then have been in a neighborhood with more direct need, and the more affluent
neighborhood’s constituents could easily partake of the improvement by walking to it
from their own neighborhood.  As CDBG guidelines currently exist, however, a poorer
community can, without its own direct, in-neighborhood benefit, serve as a catalyst or
justification for the improvement to an already well served, affluent neighborhood.
Given that such funding situations exist, there has been much criticism regarding
the inequitable distribution of CDBG funds and the siphoning of monies intended for the
poorer neighborhoods.  “Watchdog” groups believe that giving the cities the discretion to
administer and implement CDBG monies can lead to questionable project decisions.
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“Opponents have argued that, in many localities, the strong hand of federal authority in
the administration of the categorical programs was the only thing that kept these funds
targeted to the needs of low-income and minority communities” (Pratt Institute Center for
Community and Environmental Development 2001).  Opponents of CDBG believe that
the devolution of the monies to the local level invites abuse and misuse of the monies
(Kettl 1980).  Further, opponents believe that the intended recipients of these monies do
not have the political influence needed to ensure that the monies are spent consistent with
the intended purposes of the federal grant dollars (Rich 1993).  Although difficult to test
because of the subjective nature of this assertion, it is possible to look at the individual
projects funded in a locality and correlate it with the percentage of people living in
poverty, per capita income and unemployment rates for a particular city.  If more CDBG
dollars are being allocated to city-wide projects as opposed to targeted, specific projects
in low and moderate income neighborhoods, than it is reasonable to conclude that poorer
people in poorer neighborhoods do not exert the same political influence as more affluent
people in wealthier neighborhoods.
Program Eligibility
The federal government is charged with the responsibility of determining how
CDBG benefits are to be awarded, how they will be distributed and who does the
distributing.  Decisions regarding grant management and administration, program
accountability, and which body of government should determine how benefits are
distributed can be difficult.  As with any federal grant-in-aid program, there are four
generally agreed upon principles that need to be addressed when designing a program:
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(1) fairness to ensure that monies are allocated appropriately, (2) cost to ensure that
program goals are affordable and attainable, (3) necessity to ensure that a true crisis
exists and (4) capacity to ensure that the government has the ability to execute a benefit
program efficiently and effectively (Rich 1993).
To deal with these principles effectively, the federal government initiated a
formula method of distributing CDBG benefit dollars to the cities.  The formula for
determining the eligibility of a local community is based on three factors using the most
recent census data.  The formula weighs the “size of the population (weighted at .25),
number of persons in poverty (weighted at .50), and the number of overcrowded housing
units (weighted at .25)” (NCDA Washington Report 2002).  By providing these weights,
the formula determines how much money each individual locality receives (Nathan et al.
1995).  In other words, funding differences are strictly tied to the demographic of a
community and does not change according to a cities electoral, political or economic
circumstances.
By using census data, HUD can make the necessary calculations to determine
eligibility.  This formula is designed to distribute monies to cities and communities based
on their needs, not on partisan politics.  For a city or community to receive CDBG funds,
the CDBG program regulations mandate that 70 percent of any entitlement community’s
funds directly benefit the target population of low and moderate-income residents (“Code
of Federal Regulations” 2003).  According to HUD, low and moderate-income
communities are defined as communities whose members earn less than 80 percent of the
average income for the particular city.  HUD does not compare the average income to
other cities, since the inter-city differences can be significant.
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The CDBG regulations promulgated by HUD permit 30 percent of the CDBG
monies to be spent outside low and moderate-income neighborhoods as long as the target
population will benefit from the expenditure, at least indirectly.  Neighborhoods are
defined as geographically localized community census track within a larger city (“Code
of Federal Regulations” 2003). As noted earlier, this 30 percent provision allows for
CDBG monies to be spent in affluent neighborhoods, though, as also noted previously,
the rationale and effect of such an allowance continues to be seriously questioned.
Although there is some support from neighborhood organizations, public interest
and civil rights groups regarding the distribution of CDBG monies outside low and
moderate-income neighborhoods, there has been much criticism regarding the inequitable
distribution of CDBG funds and the siphoning of monies designated for the poorer
neighborhoods (Dommel 1980).  Because of this, many people believe that giving the
cities the discretion to administer and implement CDBG monies can lead to questionable
project decisions.  “Opponents argued that, in many localities, the strong hand of federal
authority in the administration of the categorical programs was the only thing that kept
these funds targeted to the needs of low-income and minority communities” (Pratt
Institute Center for Community and Environmental Development 2001).  Opponents
believe that the devolution of the monies to the local level invites abuse and misuse of the
monies.  Further, opponents believe that the intended recipients of these monies do not
have the political influence needed to ensure that the monies are spent in compliance with
federal mandates (Kettl 1980).
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Devolution from Federal Government to the Cities
The CDBG program provides for the devolution of funds from the federal
government to the local governments.  This transfer of funds gives the cities, and the
elected officials that have decision-making authority, huge discretion and power over
how these monies are allocated and distributed (Nathan et al. 1977). As a result of this
transfer of power to the cities, city planners and administrative personnel have been able
to play a greater role in the distribution of these federal grant dollars.  This power transfer
has led to the creation of professional bureaucrats who are skilled in the art of
grantsmanship.  These individuals are experts in understanding a grant’s rules and
regulations as well as in the reporting of grant-related activities. As localities became
eligible for and began to receive large shares of federal dollars, these professional grant
specialists became increasingly powerful and important (Nathan 1983).
Fortunately, HUD structured the CDBG program to offset the possibility of
absolute power of certain individuals within the entitlement community by including
citizen participation.  Although HUD has given its grant recipients some loosely written
rules in choosing projects and disbursing funds, there is a protocol that all recipient
localities must follow before it can formally select the projects and programs that are
funded by CDBG monies.  Each year, a draft plan listing the proposed CDBG funded
projects and improvements are compiled for distribution to the community for public
review.  After a set number of days, the public is invited to submit oral and written
comments to the Community Development program supervisor expressing opposition to
or support for the projects.  Once all these comments have been received and reviewed, a
public hearing is scheduled to openly discuss the community’s recommendations and
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responses to the proposed projects.  After the public hearings take place, City Council
votes to accept or reject the projects. Council then forwards a recommendation to the
mayor for her veto or approval. Although the relationship between mayor and Council is
not always harmonious, this system of funding approval does provide some level of
checks and balances.  Irrespective of the relationship, final funding decisions lie with the
mayor, who has the power to overturn Council recommendations or rejections.
To what extent does citizen participation influence city officials in their decision-
making processes?  The answer to this question is not straightforward since the power of
individual neighborhood groups varies.  According to Nathan, Dommel, Liebschutz and
Morris (1977), senior citizens tend to exert the most influence on community officials,
while organized citizen advisory groups, for example, exhibit the least influence.  This is
because senior citizens vote, active in government and are often more in touch with the
needs of the community, while the organized groups such as the American Automobile
Association (AAA) or League of Women Voters are more concerned with being heard
and promoting their groups image rather than effectuating change.
Advantages of Devolution to the Cities
Weber and Brace (1999) argue that devolution of governmental authority from the
federal government to the cities has its advantages and disadvantages.  One of the biggest
advantages of devolution is that when it occurs, the size of the national government can
be reduced. Devolution of programs to the localities means that the federal government
does not have to set up an agency, develop a budget, hire personnel, administer and
implement the program.  Rather, the local governments receiving the monies are
57
responsible for managing the programs, all without the national government’s day-to-day
involvement.  To guarantee that programs are being administered properly and in
accordance with the national government’s objectives, however, the federal government
does need to institute guidelines and auditing mechanisms to oversee the programs’
progression, but it is much easier for the federal government to monitor and oversee a
program administered elsewhere than to manage and implement a program on its own.
Weber and Brace (1999) also posit that localities are better equipped than the
federal government to administer various programs since localities are more efficient at
implementation.  This efficiency is due to the localities’ smaller size and capacity to
focus efforts on the goals and objectives of the program.  Unlike the federal government,
which is probably managing a program from the Washington, D.C. area, a locality that
implements a program will have a better “feel” for the needs of those who should benefit
from the program.
Local governments have a greater interest than does the federal government in
seeing that a government program, such as CDBG, succeeds, since local governments are
likely to be more immediately accountable to the local public.  If a mistake or
mismanagement occurs in a program that is administered by the federal government, it is
hard for the constituents of a recipient jurisdiction to hold a bureaucrat from Washington,
D.C. responsible for the mishap.  If, however, a program mistake or program
mismanagement takes place at the local level, then it is easier for the local constituency to
require accountability and rectification from the local bureaucrats and elected leaders
who run the program.
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Last, but certainly not least, localities that manage and administer their own
programs have more flexibility in administering their own program requirements and
guidelines. This ability for local management flexibility is important because local
officials are likely to know best what local citizens need.  By giving local governments
more discretion and power in the administration of a program, localities can modify a
program’s requirements if it is not obtaining the desired outcomes.
Disadvantages of Devolution to the Cities
Opposition to the devolution of government authority to the cities stems from a
basic mistrust of the ideological, political and economic behavior of the state.  Concerned
that devolution of authority will lead to disingenuous appropriations of the federal
benefit, opponents of local grant administration and assessment claim that only the
national government can and should maintain control of significant federal community
improvement monies.
Giving localities the ability to manage and administer federal programs, like
CDBG, can influence the electorate’s perspective on local politicians.  If a program is
highly successful, then the local politicians can claim credit for its success and use it to
their political advantage.  In other words, the devolution of power to the localities can
give local politicians greater visibility and recognition for doing a good job, all with
monies provided by the national government.  Not only, then, can federal monies be
potentially misused by visibility-seeking local officials, but, the national leaders who
lobby for a particular program may receive negative publicity from an ill-gotten program.
Another disadvantage of devolution of authority to the local level is the potential
for a misapplication of funds.  If a locality sets a program’s guidelines to benefit sectors
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of the citizenry other than those for which the money, at the federal level, was intended,
then those federal funds are being misapplied. Despite the fact that auditing procedures
may exist to control such problems, when a locality has enormous latitude in
administering a program, there may be little that the national government can do to
control exactly how funds are used.  As a result, a program’s federal dollars are
sometimes accounted for by the locality in technically legitimate ways, even when those
funds have not been applied according to the intended spirit of the program.
The Spirit of Cooperation
Elazar (1993) has said that our society is not just about the federal government
telling the states and localities what to do.  Rather, we have a cooperative relationship
among federal and state and local governments. This cooperative relationship allows both
the states and localities and the national government to achieve their goals.  In Elazar’s
opinion, the allocation of money and of authority is not about devolution; rather it is
about cooperation.
This cooperative viewpoint can be extended to the entitlement cities that receive
federal grant dollars.  Although there are very significant advantages to having the
localities assume more authority and responsibility, the reality is such that recipient
jurisdictions need to be watched and held accountable for their behaviors.  While it is true
that devolution allows localities to exert more authority and, because of greater visibility
with the electorate, be more accountable, cities cannot always be trusted to spend federal
dollars according to the rules and regulations as set forth by national government.
Therefore, a sound argument can be made that even as local decision-making has many
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advantages, the national government must always stay involved to oversee and ensure
that national interests are being met.  Devolution of authority from the federal to the state
and/or local levels may have many desirable results, but many public policy analysts
posit that limited devolution of authority is the most workable option for consistently and
responsibly serving national interests (Dilger 1989).
The most effective use of federal monies is most likely to be maintained when,
even with significant devolution (or cooperation), the federal funding agencies construct
and impose general rules and guidelines about how federal monies can be spent and
determine what ultimate goals and objectives must be reached. In other words, political
scientists such as Dilger advocate that the federal government should retain the upper
hand, and when push comes to shove, the federal government should act as the senior
partner in an otherwise equal relationship.  This senior partner status assures the federal
government that authority is being used appropriately and that federal priorities are met.
This control, though limited, is maintained since the national elected officials are
interested in receiving credit for the monies allocated and will always want a role in
determining where grant dollars will go.   After all, they will want to claim-credit for the
projects that get funded.
Why CDBG?
The CDBG program serves as an exceptional tool to test the distributive politics
model and the distribution of public benefits. CDBG benefits are distributed to the cities
with few qualifications.  In order for a city to receive CDBG funding from the federal
government, it must have a minimum population of 50,000 (CDBG Entitlement Program
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Regulations 1996). (Cities with less than 50,000 are sometimes eligible for discretionary
funds as approved by HUD.) Other than the formula, which includes poverty rate and
housing requirements, a CDBG award does not depend upon a locality’s overall financial
or economic situation.  Although an award amount might vary according to a city’s level
of poverty and suitable housing, the fact remains that any metropolitan city with a
population of at least 50,000 people is eligible to receive some CDBG funding regardless
of its financial well-being. In other words, an affluent city in Connecticut with a per
capita income of twice the national average can apply for and receive grant dollars as can
a West Virginia city with a per capita income well below the national average.
Additionally, funding awards are not based on political partisanship.  Therefore, a city
with a Republican mayor who was a major supporter of a Republican president or
Senator or Congressional Representative is not more likely to receive additional CDBG
dollars because of this affiliation.
Formula changes, that determine how much money an entitlement city is to
receive, can fluctuate from administration to administration.  Although the CDBG
program enjoys bipartisan support, it is not uncommon to see small and frequent changes
in its eligibility formula.  As recently as 2005, for example, formula changes were made
that resulted in an overall reduction of money for the localities.  The reason for the
formula change is unclear, and the Bush administration would not be specific as to the
reason, other than to say that it was to increase accountability and responsibility at the
local-level.
According to CDBG guidelines, entitlement communities are charged with the
responsibility of developing their own programs and funding priorities.  They are
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required to have citizen participation in programming selections, to draw down funds
appropriately and to follow the proper procedures in the administration and execution of
legitimate programs (Rich 1993).  Provided that these programs directly or indirectly
benefit low and moderate-income residents, a city and its elected officials can allocate
monies to a variety of projects, ranging from the construction of public facilities and
streets to the purchase and acquisition of real property.  In other words, provided that
cities administer the CDBG program properly, elected officials at the local levels enjoy
immense freedom in spending the entitlement dollars.  Because of this flexibility, it is not
unusual to see spending in public improvement and economic development programs
vary drastically from city to city.
Finally, the availability of accurate and detailed data is yet another reason why the
federal CDBG program is an excellent vehicle for testing the effectiveness of the
distributive politics model. For the three most recent calendar years, HUD has maintained
data on the programs and projects proposed by each entitlement city by category type,
including acquisition, administrative and planning, economic development, housing,
public improvements, and public services.   These categories allow each CDBG
entitlement city to report its proposed allocations and projects in an uniform format.  This
standardized reporting requirement permits an easy comparison of spending habits and
program allocations for each CDBG entitlement city.  Table 3.1, which provides a more
detailed breakdown of the allocation activities reported by HUD, describes the
standardized format and program categories for each CDBG entitlement city.  Of the six
program categories described in Table 3.1, the economic development, housing and
public services categories are likely to benefit the poor and disenfranchised.  It is these
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categories that provide opportunities for elected officials to manipulate CDBG
allocations.
Conclusion
By studying CDBG, a more sophisticated distributive politics framework that
better explains the motivations and behaviors of elected officials will be developed.  This
framework will demonstrate that decision-makers allocate public dollars based on the
political, economic and social environment around them.  Expanding the traditional
distributive politics model to include a thorough understanding of the saliency and role of
contextual factors will result in easier and more reliable predictions about how public
benefits are likely to be allocated.
These contextual factors may help the political scientist develop a matrix or
schema that can accurately reflect and predict a pattern of behavior and decisions.  These
behaviors, for example, may stem from the way a mayor sees her role in the community,
how she perceives the economic well-being of her community, how she assesses the
needs and wants of her political counterparts she serves.  Ultimately, these factors will
prove instrumental in predicting the way mayors or elected officials distribute CDBG
benefits.
The next chapter, through the use of a case study approach, will examine four
Pennsylvania cities and their decision-making processes in the allocation of CDBG
dollars.  Specifically, CDBG allocations for each city will be examined and explained by
looking at a mayor’s motivations and influences, form of government, partisanship, size
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of city, the strategies in dealing with and appeasing their city-council, coupled with the
potential threat of viable challengers to unseat them when reelection time occurs.
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Table 3.1                                 Grantee Use of CDBG Funds by Category
Acquisition - This category allows for the acquisition of real estate for public purposes only.
Permissible expenses include the costs associated with relocating an existing business, demolition,
and site improvement.
Administrative and Planning - This category allows for the reasonable costs associated with the
design, development, implementation and evaluation of overall program management.  Permissible
expenses include salaries, wages, and related costs associated with the administration of the program.
Environmental studies, area neighborhood plans, and budget preparation are allowable costs covered
by this category.
Economic Development - This category allows for the direct financial assistance to private, for-profit
entities providing that these businesses create or retain jobs and benefit low and moderate-income
persons.  Permissible expenses include the acquisition, construction and rehabilitation of commercial
and industrial buildings.  Loans, loan guarantees and equipment purchases are also acceptable.
Housing – This category allows for the construction and rehabilitation of permanent housing of
single-family and multi-family homes and shelters.  Permissible rehabilitation expenses include paint,
smoke detectors, locks, landscaping and water and sewer upgrades.
Public Improvements - This category allows for the rehabilitation of public facilities such as senior,
handicapped, youth, neighborhood or childhood centers.  Permissible expenses include infrastructure
repairs to include streets and sidewalks, as well as tree planting and other landscaping improvements.
Public Services - This category allows for the costs associated with such services as drug and alcohol
counseling, daycare, and meals programs.  Permissible expenses include the rental of facilities to







 In Chapter 2, a symbiotic model (see figure 2.1) was introduced to explain the
preferences and actions of bureaucratic and elected officials that are responsible for the
allocation of CDBG monies. This model graphically displayed a framework where the
behavior of each actor was dependent upon the actions of other actors.  In other words,
only when the national, local and bureaucratic officials satisfy the needs of one another,
either by giving credit for a project, relaxing administrative oversight or supporting “pet
projects,” can the disbursement of federal benefits be allocated efficiently and without
controversy. This model reinforced the notion that all interested parties must address and
satisfy the needs of others in order to accomplish their own personal agendas.
To test the efficacy of this model, I tested the principles that local-level
bureaucrats need to be responsive to the local-level elected officials who in turn need to
be responsive to the national-level elected officials.  Unfortunately, I was unable to test
the responsiveness of the national-level elected officials to the national-level bureaucrats
since few national legislators would agree to meet with me.
This symbiotic or circular approach suggests that each level feeds off the other to
a smooth distribution of federal monies.  These principles were tested by examining four
case study cities in the state of Pennsylvania: Sharon, Altoona, Pittsburgh, and
Philadelphia (see Table 4.2).  Each city was selected because each differs from the others
in size, economics, political inclinations and racial composition. City selections within
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Pennsylvania were also based on geographical location, with Sharon to the northwest,
Altoona in the central part of the state, Pittsburgh to the west and Philadelphia to the east.
Located in the northwestern part of the state and the smallest of the Pennsylvania
cities studied was Sharon. With a population of over 16,300 (2000 U.S. Census), Sharon
does not meet CDBG minimum population requirements of 50,000 (U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development 2003), but does qualify for CDBG monies because it is
considered a distressed community.  Sharon operates under a strong mayoral form of
government, and the mayor can be voted into office as many times as the electorate
desires.  In other words, there are no term limit requirements for the mayor of Sharon.
Sharon’s City-Council is elected at-large.
The next city examined was Altoona, Pennsylvania.  Located in the central part of
the state, Altoona has a general population of nearly 50,000 (2000 U.S. Census), eligible
to receive CDBG monies since they were eligible under HUD’s original model cities
program.   Similar to Sharon, Altoona has a mayoral form of government with no term
limit for its mayors.  Unlike Sharon, Altoona operates under a weak mayoral form of
government whereby a professional manager runs the day-to-day operations of the city.
Altoona’s City-Council is elected at-large.
Pittsburgh, the second largest city in Pennsylvania, is located in the southwestern
part of the state.  With a population of 330,000 (2000 U.S. Census), Pittsburgh easily
meets CDBG’s population requirements.  Pittsburgh operates under a strong mayoral
form of government and has no term limit requirements for its mayors.  Pittsburgh’s City-
Council is elected by district.
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The largest of the Pennsylvania cities studied was Philadelphia.  Located in the
eastern part of the state, Philadelphia has a population of 1.5 million (2000 U.S. Census),
which makes it, like Pittsburgh, easily eligible for CDBG monies.  Philadelphia operates
under a strong-mayoral form of government and has term limit of two four year terms for
its mayors.  Philadelphia’s City-Council is elected by both district and at-large.
To understand how and why cities and their mayors allocate CDBG dollars, I
visited each city, researched their CDBG archives, and conducted personal interviews
with mayors, council-members, program administrators, HUD officials and national
legislators.  Each visit involved multiple on-site meetings or telephone conversations with
various level officials, in order to obtain a better understanding of the decision-making
processes and motivations of officials at every level.
During these meetings and conversations, questions were asked regarding each
official’s overall familiarity with and understanding of the CDBG program, and the role
each official played in the project selection and distribution processes.  To ensure the
accuracy and integrity of the interviews, a set of standardized questions were developed
for each official (see appendices A & B).  For the most part, the standardized questions
were identical, with the exception of those issue areas that were specific to the individual
official.  To encourage candid responses, interview questions were written to be non-
leading, non-controversial and non-threatening.  An analysis of the interview responses
will be summarized later in the chapter, but first, an in-depth review of the CDBG
funding levels and project histories for each of the four Pennsylvania cities will be
examined.
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 These case studies will examine a number of such contextual factors -- including
the size of city, form of government, wealth of city, geographical region, political
affiliation of administration and incumbency -- in an effort to better explain allocation
decisions made by local officials.  As a case study to illustrate the efficacy of these
contextual factors in explaining allocation decisions, I will examine the Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, a federal program that supports state and
municipal programs and projects, with four Pennsylvania cities that have varying
political, economic and social characteristics.  By applying these characteristics to the
symbiotic model, the outcomes of CDBG allocations will vary by city.  These outcomes
will be shaped by form of government, term limits, party, racial composition, economic
and council type.    In addition to the contextual factors and through stakeholder
interviews, there will be explanations for how and why CDBG allocation decisions are
made. These reasons suggest that housing allocations that favor the poor to infrastructure
improvements for the middle class.
Null Hypothesis
 The Null hypothesis suggests that there is no difference or relationship between a
variable and its outcome unless tested by some form of statistical analysis, which is either
accepted or rejected (“Definitions of Null hypothesis on the Web” 2006).  When a Null
hypothesis is accepted, the chance that a specific outcome has occurred by chance is
probable.  When a Null hypothesis is rejected, the probability that a statistical or causal
relationship has occurred by chance is not likely; with the conclusion that something else
is going on with the data.
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In this chapter, the Null hypothesis suggests that no statistically significant
relationship exists between the four Pennsylvania cities studied and the contextual factors
that help explain CDBG allocation decision making.  In other words, the unique attributes
of each case study data has no observable differences in how and why allocation
decisions are made.  Unfortunately, the case study data does not lead to a straight-forward
conclusion regarding the Null hypothesis. The comments and conclusions from the
CDBG decision makers and stakeholders suggest that something is going on in their
communities and that specific causal relationships may exist.  These causal relationships
will become more apparent in the case study analysis of the four Pennsylvania cities that
follow.
Sharon, Pennsylvania
The City of Sharon is situated in northwestern Pennsylvania next to the Ohio
border and is located within 75 miles of Cleveland, Erie and Pittsburgh.  Its safe
neighborhoods and old town charm has allowed it to be ranked among the top ten towns
in the United States (“Hometown Index” 2005).  Sharon has a population of 16,300 of
which 13.6 percent are minority.  Sharon’s 2005 operating budget was $9,247,265 (US
Census 2000).
Sharon operates under a strong mayoral form of government, with all five of its
Council members elected at-large.  The mayor’s job is a full-time position and the
mayor’s office is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the city.  Since 1978,
Sharon has had two consecutive Democratic mayors: Richard Price, from 1978 to 2002,
and David Ryan, from 2002 to the present.   Sharon’s current council members (2005) are
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Sharon 16,328 Mayor-Council Unlimited At Large
Altoona 49,523 Council-Manager Unlimited At Large
Pittsburgh 334,563 Mayor-Council Unlimited +By District
Philadelphia 1,517,550 Mayor-Council 2  terms At Large and
By District
*2000 U.S. Census
+Council by district as of 1990
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all Democrats.  The fact that they are 100 percent Democrat is not surprising since nearly
two thirds of Sharon’s population voted Democrat in the 2001 mayoral election (Rookey
2005).
Sharon’s CDBG Program History
Since 1983, Sharon has received an average of $859,000 CDBG dollars each year
and has never received less than $660,000 entitlement dollars in any one year (see
appendix C).  As with other entitlement cities, this consistent source of revenue has
allowed the city of Sharon to plan and fund expensive operating and capital line items for
the benefit of low and moderate income residents within its borders.
Interestingly, there were very few significant funding changes that occurred in
Sharon throughout most of the years the city had applied for and received CDBG monies.
Perhaps because the same person held the office of mayor (Price 1978-2002) for much of
the time CDBG monies have been available, the fact remains that funding patterns were
relatively constant.  Just after the first year of the new mayor’s 2002 election, however,
CDBG allocations started to shift.  There are three possible explanations that account for
this shift: the new mayor’s inexperience, his and his staff’s unfamiliarity with CDBG
regulations, and self-interest on the part of the new mayor and associated officials.  These
explanations will be addressed later in this chapter.
As figure 4.2 illustrates, roughly 51 percent of Sharon’s 16,500 residents live in
CD eligible neighborhoods.  This means that one of every two Sharon resident lives in a
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Figure 4.2
City of Sharon CDBG Eligible
Neighborhoods
.
Source:  City of Sharon, Community
              Development Block Grant,
              2000 Census Tracts
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neighborhood that is eligible for federal dollars.  Because of this ratio, Sharon program
administrators can request and allocate CDBG dollars with ease.
How Sharon’s CDBG process works
Recognizing the value of public participation, some mayors developed innovative
approaches to meeting HUD’s requirements for community input.  Former Sharon Mayor
Price, for example, said that he has gone door-to-door in many of his neighborhoods
asking residents about the type of projects that would be important to them and asking
what could be done to improve their neighborhoods.  He said he was often accompanied
by a City-Council member to join him in his neighborhood walks.  Another tactic used by
Price was to go to the neighborhood schools and have the children take information
packets to their parents asking for project suggestions.  These innovative information-
gathering initiatives resulted in greater participation and input, which, in turn not only
allowed HUD’s community participation regulations to be met, but also allowed Price,
for many years,  to successfully request and appropriately allocate CDBG monies  (Price
2003).
Contrasting CDBG Allocations Under Differing Mayoral Administrations
According to Table 4.3, the difference between most of the CDBG spending
categories is negligible, with the exception of housing and public facility/clearances.
During the Price administration, spending patterns for all categories remained constant,
with very little variation.  It was not until a new mayor and administration was in place
that the spending categories began to shift.
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Symbiotic Model Applied to Sharon
Local-level bureaucrats responsive to local-level elected officials
During the Price administration, a long-term supervisor was responsible for the
day-to-day administration of the CDBG program.  This supervisor was experienced in the
nuances of the CDBG program, from initial application to final audit.  Her institutional
knowledge of the city of Sharon and applicable HUD regulations allowed her to make
fair and reasonable allocation decisions (Tolbert 2005).  As a result, the Community
Development office ran efficiently and professionally, and city residents enjoyed a stable
and consistent flow of federal monies to CDBG eligible projects, with little variation.
Unfortunately, Sharon’s CDBG program experience and expertise did not survive a new
mayoral administration.  Similar to other small cities, where one individual constitutes
the entire community development staff, the professionalism and success of an office is
often contingent upon one person’s skill level.  Therefore, when the sitting mayor of 24
years retired and a new mayor (Ryan) was installed, a new program supervisor with little
experience in CDBG procedures and regulations was appointed resulting in new CDBG
funding priorities.
The shifting of funds from one project to another, however, may have had less to
do with an inexperienced staff, and more to do with a new mayor trying to raise his
visibility and popularity.  Unlike his predecessor, who rarely had any legitimate
competition (Price 2004), Mayor Ryan faced a viable challenger after his first term in
office.  It was during Ryan’s administration, which faced being unseated by a viable
mayoral challenger that some significant allocation shifts started to occur, leading one to
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Table 4.3   Spending Habits between Mayoral Administrations for Sharon, Pa
Sharon, Pennsylvania
Significant Funding Differences between Mayoral Administrations












































































Price 18%   - 6% 38%   - 5% 25% 1% 7%   -   -   -   - 100%
Ryan 20%   - 4% 25%   - 7% 20% 11% 13%   -   -   -   - 100%
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conclude that the pressure of seeking reelection may have had a material impact on
CDBG allocations.
During Ryan’s four years, the largest shift in funding was in allocation of CDBG
monies for housing -- from 38 percent under Price to 25 percent under Ryan.  When
asked about this allocation differential, Price indicated that he was most concerned with
spending CDBG dollars in accordance with their intended purposes and less concerned
with trying to spend money in order to please a community or curry favor (Price 2004).
Also, clearance and infrastructure increased from 1 percent to 11 percent during the same
period. These funding changes -- a significant drop in allocations for improved housing
for underserved citizens, with a simultaneous increase in funding for particular
infrastructure projects -- seem to indicate that less money was being allocated to low-
income neighborhoods for housing and more money was being spent on high visibility
projects such as street resurfacing, demolition of vacant buildings, and tree planting.
Under the Price administration, the CDBG program supervisor enjoyed both job
security and autonomy in her position.  She continued to support the mayor’s wishes by
sponsoring projects that were consistent with his local-level priorities and goals, while
during the Ryan administration, however, a new CDBG supervisor was appointed who
was more willing to fund the projects that were important to his boss (the mayor).
Although the supervisors under Price and Ryan did what their bosses wished, the main
difference between the two was with the kinds of projects they secured CDBG funding.
With Price, it seemed evident that he was more aware of and willing to address the
genuine needs of the underserved citizens of Sharon, while Ryan and his CDBG
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supervisor seemed more concerned with providing CDBG funding for projects that were
highly visible and important or necessary to Ryan’s reelection (Tolbert 2005).
While both administrations may have acted out of some degree of self-interest, it
would appear that Price and his supervisor also kept the interests of the underserved
citizenry prominent -- which may have been facilitated, somewhat, by the lack of
reelection challenge faced by Price, as well as by Price’s genuine desire to stay with the
spirit of the CDBG program and to serve the underserved.
Local-level elected officials responsive to national-level elected officials
Mayor Price displayed a willingness and ability to give credit to national-level
officials --the federal legislators -- as long as these legislators continued to provide
Sharon with federal dollars. Former Sharon Mayor Price offered his opinion of the
distribution of federal CDBG monies this way: “I absolutely knew where this money was
coming from and had no qualms about giving them [federal government] credit, which
they were all too happy to accept” (Price  2004).
Altoona, Pennsylvania
The City of Altoona is located in central Pennsylvania and sits on the eastern side
of the Allegheny Mountains, about a two hour drive from Pittsburgh and the capital,
Harrisburg.  Known for being a railroad town, Altoona has approximately 50,000
residents with only a 4 percent minority population.  Altoona’s annual operating budget
for 2005 was $21 million dollars (US Census 2000).
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The city of Altoona operates under a weak mayoral form of government, with a
City Manager -- rather than the mayor himself -- running the day-to-day operations of the
city.  This manager oversees the operation of all city departments, and has the authority
to appoint and discharge city employees. Altoona’s six council members and mayor are
elected at-large.  The mayor also serves as a seventh council member, presiding over and
participating in all council meetings.
Since 1975, Altoona has had seven mayors; four Democrats and three
Republicans. Historically, Altoona’s city council consists of both Republican and
Democratic representatives.  As of 2005, five of the six council members as well as the
mayor are Republican while the other council member is a Democrat.  Republican voters
outnumber Democratic voters in Altoona by nearly a two to one ratio (Crowl 2005).
Altoona’s CDBG Program History
Altoona has received CDBG entitlement dollars since the program’s beginnings.
During each of these thirty years, Altoona has received an average of $3.25 million
dollars each year and has never received less than $1.5 entitlement dollars in any one year
(see appendix D).  This consistent source of revenue has allowed Altoona to plan and
fund expensive projects that aid low and moderate income residents.
During the program’s early years, the bulk of Altoona’s CDBG dollars were
allocated to neighborhood infrastructure and housing projects citywide, such as street
reconstruction and the creation of low and moderate-income housing.  As time passed,
however, greater shares of CDBG dollars were allocated to economic development and
anti-crime initiatives.  The economic development allocations were made to entice
business and investment in the community to encourage people to work and live in
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Altoona, while anti-crime spending was allocated to enhance Altoona’s police force in
poorer neighborhoods (Johnson 2005).
As figure 4.3 illustrates, roughly 50 percent of Altoona’s 50,000 residents live in
CD eligible neighborhoods.  This means that one of every two Altoona residents lives in
a neighborhood that is eligible for federal dollars.  Because of this ratio, program
administrators can assign project dollars, under the terms and conditions set forth by
HUD, with ease.
How Altoona’s CDBG process works
Although all entitlement cities are expected and required to solicit public input on
project selections and allocations, the city of Altoona goes the extra mile in trying to
reach its constituency.  Each year, Altoona holds a series of public meetings during the
project selection process (see appendix 3).  These meetings are held at public libraries
and senior citizen centers and are advertised in the newspapers as well as on the internet.
In addition, those organizations and agencies that received CDBG dollars in prior years
are notified of these public meeting via the U.S. mail.  Typically, meetings are held at
differing locations throughout the city to make access and community input as convenient
as possible.
After public input has been solicited, Altoona’s community development
department finalizes its selections and forwards its CDBG program selections to the
mayor and City-Council for their formal approval.  In this regard, the elected local
officials act as a “rubber stamp” and typically do not have any direct input or influence
into the CDBG selection process.  According to Mary Johnson, Altoona CDBG program
supervisor, “the mayor and council defer to my office’s expertise and experience in the
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Figure 4.3
City of Altoona CDBG Eligible
Neighborhoods
Source:  City of Altoona, Community
              Development Block Grant,
              2000 Census Tracts
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decision-making process.  In my experience administering the [CDBG] program, I cannot
remember a mayor or councilmember telling me what program to fund or reject”
(Johnson 2005).
Contrasting CDBG Allocations Under Differing Mayoral Administrations
Unlike Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, where Democratic mayors have dominated
the mayor’s offices historically and from the start of the CDBG program, Altoona has,
historically, had both Democratic and Republican mayors.  Since the beginning of the
federal CDBG program (1975), Altoona has had four Democratic and three Republican
mayors (“Altoona’s Manager Office” 2005).    Despite regular shifts in the mayors’
political affiliations, the city of Altoona has not demonstrated noticeable funding
differences from one mayoral administration to another.
Of those differences identified (see Table 4.4), such as economic development,
program managers simply stated that their office became more aggressive in funding
individuals and organizations that had a greater capacity to repay economic development
loans.  By awarding CDBG dollars more carefully, the economic development dollars
were being repaid in a more timely fashion – resulting in more monies being available
and reprogrammed for future development projects.
Symbiotic Model Applied to Altoona
Local-level bureaucrats responsive to local-level elected officials
As long as the program supervisor of Altoona performs her job professionally and
equitably, she can feel comfortable that her job is secure. “Of course I try to be sensitive
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to those projects that are important to my bosses, but in all fairness, I am rarely asked to
fund something” (Johnson 2005).  Of the past and present mayors who understood that
CDBG funds came from the federal government, they seem to continue to be reconciled
to giving the relevant federal legislators all the necessary credit, providing that federal
dollars continue to flow into Altoona.
Irrespective of the fact that Altoona has a history of electing mayors from
differing political parties, its CDBG staff has remained relatively constant and non-
political.   Regardless of a Democratic or Republican administration, or of low
unemployment or high unemployment, Altoona’s elected officials have not significantly
influenced the selection or distribution of CDBG funds. Altoona employs a long term
program supervisor, with more than 20 years experience, who appears to be secure in her
position and makes CDBG allocation decisions based on need and program guidelines.
One explanation for the program supervisor’s longevity and independence is the
lack of electoral competition in any of Altoona’s mayoral elections.  Despite the fact that
there has been a new mayor in Altoona much more frequently than there had ever been in
its small-city counterpart, Sharon, there has been very little legitimate competition in any
of Altoona’s mayoral elections in the last 30 years, with the margin of victory for
mayoral candidates very one-sided.  Without competition, mayors are less motivated to
shift or reallocate CDBG dollars to those programs and projects that can benefit
incumbent officials.
Local-level elected officials responsive to national-level elected officials
Due to an absence of legitimate competition in the mayor’s office, or because the
mayor’s position is basically a part-time job with a full-time city manager running the
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city, the need for giving credit to the national-level legislators is not as prevalent in
Altoona as it appears to be in cities in which the mayor faces significant electoral
challenge or wields significant city-management power.
Additionally, since the mayor of Altoona is a part-time position and operates
under a home rule charter with a full-time city manager, the mayor cannot exert the
influence or power as in other cities where the mayor and his or her office directly
manage the city and many of its resources.  In a city such as Altoona, the power and
prestige of the mayor’s office is significantly diminished, making the ability to recognize
the national legislators for their support less desirable.   Another possible reason for the
diminished need to recognize national-level support is due to the size of the awards the
city has received.  Altoona’s CDBG awards are relatively small compared with
Philadelphia’s or Pittsburgh’s, monitoring and accountability are less complicated. In
other words, it is much easier to audit and track a $100,000 housing refurbishment
program, than it is to monitor and track a $20 million dollar housing refurbishment
program.  Entitlement cities, such as Altoona, that receive fewer dollars from the federal
government seem to be able to maintain a better standard of spending (and accounting
for) CDBG dollars well and appropriately than do cities receiving much larger grants. It
is simply easier to monitor smaller amounts of grant monies than it is to monitor larger
amounts (Rieger 2005).
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
“The City of Pittsburgh is located at the confluence of the Ohio, Monogahela, and
Allegheny Rivers” (“Comprehensive Annual Financial Report” 2000) and resides in the
southwestern part of the state. Pittsburgh, with a current population of nearly
85
Table 4.4   Spending Habits between Mayoral Administrations for Altoona, Pa
Altoona, Pennsylvania
Significant Funding Differences between Mayoral Administrations







































































Milliron 16% 1% 5% 36%   - 10% 2% 27%   -   -   - 3%   - 100%
Voltz 17%   - 14% 27%   - 15% 9% 15% 3%   -   -   -   - 100%
Martin 16%   - 17% 22%   - 11% 10% 20% 3%   -   -   - 1% 100%
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335,000 residents, has an annual operating budget of $330 million dollars and is the
largest of the region’s [north east] 130 municipalities (US Census 2000).
The City of Pittsburgh functions as a strong mayor-council form of government
and is made up of three governing bodies: the Mayor’s Office, City Controller and City
Council.   The Mayor’s Office is the administrative and servicing branch for the City of
Pittsburgh.  It includes the operating departments such as Police and Fire, as well and the
economic development and maintenance arms such as City Planning and Public Works.
The City-Controller’s office is the official “watchdog” for the City of Pittsburgh in that it
reviews, monitors and reconciles all monies disbursed to ensure that expenditures are in
compliance with relevant rules and regulations.  Finally, there is City-Council.  Council is
inherently the most political of the three bodies and functions as a direct link to the
public.  Council is charged with the responsibility of overseeing and approving any
initiatives and actions that may impact its constituents and the City at large.  Whenever a
new policy initiative is proposed or expenditure request is made, all three bodies need to
be involved and consulted with before approval and implementation can take place.
The City of Pittsburgh has five times more registered Democrats than
Republicans.  In fact, there has not been a Republican mayor in Pittsburgh since 1936
(“All Politics” 2006).  This phenomenon is not surprising, however, given that Democrats
out number Republicans in Pittsburgh by nearly a 5 to 1 ratio (“Pittsburgh Post-Gazette”
2005).
Pittsburgh’s CDBG Program History
Since the program’s beginning in 1975, the federal government has consistently
awarded the City of Pittsburgh CDBG dollars each year.  Pittsburgh receives an average
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of $20.4 million dollars per year and has never been awarded less than $14 million
dollars in any one entitlement year (see appendix E).  Because of this predictable and
reliable source of revenue, entitlement cities like Pittsburgh are able to plan for large-
scale and long-term capital improvement programs.
Historically, the City of Pittsburgh allocates the majority of its CDBG dollars to
housing projects and infrastructure improvements citywide, such as the rehabilitation of
homes and businesses or low-interest loans for the purchase and acquisition of housing in
low and moderate-income neighborhoods.  The next largest allocation of monies goes to
economic development projects.  These funds are used to assist expanding businesses, for
land acquisition for future development projects, and to assist interested manufacturers
and industry in relocating to CD eligible neighborhoods.  The theory behind funding this
type of economic development initiatives is that local jobs will be created, and the
neighborhoods will be strengthened by encouraging business or industry to locate in a
targeted community.
As figure 4.4 illustrates, nearly fifty three percent (53%) of the residents of the
City of Pittsburgh live in neighborhoods that qualify them for CDBG entitlement dollars.
This means that there are nearly 175,000 low to moderate-income residents in the City of
Pittsburgh who can directly benefit from the program.  In order for the remaining 155,000
residents to benefit from CDBG dollars, the program or project selections must have an
indirect benefit to the low and moderate-income residents.
How Pittsburgh’s CDBG Process Works
Although HUD has given entitlement cities, including Pittsburgh, some loosely
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Figure 4.4
City of Pittsburgh CDBG Eligible
Neighborhoods
Source:  City of Pittsburgh, Community
              Development Block Grant,
              2000 Census Tracts
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written rules in choosing projects and disbursing funds, there is a standard protocol that a
city must follow before it can formally select the projects and programs that are funded
by CDBG monies. Before the mayor publicizes the approved CDBG funded projects,
Pittsburgh holds a series of public hearings to receive input from the community.  Each
year, a draft plan listing of the proposed projects and improvements are compiled for
distribution to the community for public review.  After 30 days, the public is invited to
submit oral and written comments to the Community Development program supervisor
expressing opposition to or support of the projects.  Once all these comments have been
received and reviewed, a public hearing is scheduled to openly discuss the community’s
recommendations and responses to the proposed projects.  After the public hearings take
place, Pittsburgh’s City-Council votes to accept or reject the projects. Council then
forwards a recommendation to the Mayor for her veto or approval.  The final funding
decisions ultimately lie with the Mayor, and the rejection, by council, of any project or
organization can be overturned by the office of the Mayor.
CDBG grant proposals are submitted to HUD by Office of the Mayor and his
program administrators.  This proposal contains the names and budgets of the proposed
projects and a brief explanation of how they are benefiting the targeted neighborhoods
(directly or indirectly).  Providing the proposed projects meet the grant’s criteria, the
Mayor has full authority to recommend and approve any projects she desires.  Once HUD
approves the grant, the Mayor needs to hold public hearing from within the community to
obtain the community’s input and recommendations on spending the money.  After the
hearing, the Mayor forwards the project list before Council for final approval.  Realizing
that Council members have an allegiance to their own constituencies, the Mayor will try
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to “spread the wealth” and support key projects within each Council district.  This
behavior usually guarantees prompt passage of the Mayor’s CDBG budget.  After
Council approves the budget, the City Controller monitors the approved projects and
programs to make sure that the federal funds are being spent properly.  Although the
relationship among these three entities is not always harmonious, it does guarantee some
level of checks and balances (Bellisario 2005).
Contrasting CDBG Allocations Under Differing Mayoral Administrations
Since 1975, when the CDBG program was created, the City of Pittsburgh has had
three Democratic mayors:  Richard Caliguiri, Sophie Masloff, and Tom Murphy [it
should be noted that Bob O’Connor took office in January 2006 and making it too early
to identify any discernable spending patterns, each of these mayors demonstrated
differing strategies and priorities in allocating CDBG monies].
As Table 4.5 indicates, the spending patterns between mayoral administrations
seemed most prominent in public works, such as street resurfacing; recreation, such as
creation and improvement of parks and playgrounds; housing, such as winterization and
rehabilitation of existing structures;  public safety, including equipment and facility
rehabs; and Mayor’s Office initiatives, which might involve the funding of community
and neighborhood organizations.
The most discernable difference between mayoral administrations occurs with the
election of Mayor Murphy after Sophie Masloff’s term in office. Mayor Murphy’s
priorities for public works’ projects and Mayor’s Office initiatives are in marked contrast
to prioritizing of housing and public safety issues.  Mayor Masloff, in fact, allocated
almost no dollars from the city’s CDBG budget for public works initiatives, instead
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funding public works activities from local tax dollars.  Caliguiri, who preceded Masloff,
seemed to allocate a disproportionate amount of CDBG dollars to recreational activities.
It should be noted, however, that Caliguiri once worked as an administrator for the
Department of Parks and Recreation, reflecting a special interest in recreational activities
and programming.
Symbiotic Model Applied to Pittsburgh
Local-level bureaucrats responsive to local-level elected officials
The city of Pittsburgh provides the strongest documentation that a symbiotic
model is a reliable measure of how and why CDBG-funded projects are selected.  By
providing the Mayor’s Office and Council members with funding for their “pet projects,”
the community development staff is able to keep all their bosses happy and program the
other CDBG monies for projects that are consistent with the terms and conditions of the
CDBG program.
The City of Pittsburgh has a professional and competent bureaucratic staff that
administers its CDBG program and projects efficiently and effectively.  For the most
part, the program staff makes project recommendations in accordance with all applicable
rules and regulations. Unfortunately, though all rules are followed, not all allocations are
made in the intended spirit of CDBG program. Much of this deviation from the intended
character and achievements of the CDBG program is due to the structure of Pittsburgh’s
City Council.
In 1990, the City of Pittsburgh switched from a council at-large to a council by
district system.  For the five year period prior to the council by district system, CDBG
spending for major long-term projects (such as a major bridge repair or the rehabilitation
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Table 4.5   Spending Habits between Mayoral Administrations for Pittsburgh, Pa.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Significant Funding Differences between Mayoral Administrations








































































Caliguiri 11% 35%   - 27%   - 18%   -   -   - 2% 5% 2%   - 100%
Masloff 21% 50%   - 9%   - 15%   -   -   - 1% 1% 3%   - 100%
Murphy 13% 41%   - 2% 3% 16% 2%   -   - 3% 16% 4%   - 100%
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of a recreation center) was nearly 42 percent greater than during the subsequent five years
since council by-district was introduced (“CDBG Comprehensive Plan” 1990).  The most
reasonable explanation for this occurrence is that funding priorities changed once City-
Council was elected by district.  When a Council member represents one portion of the
community, he or she is likely to be most motivated to tackle the more narrow and
neighborhood-specific projects that will garner direct and immediate political gain, rather
than citywide projects that may not be as visibly beneficial to a councilmember’s own
constituency.
The Mayor’s Office contributes to Council’s direct participation by giving them
absolute control over a small portion of the CDBG monies in a line item called
Community Based Organization (CBO).   This item is designed to give each of
Pittsburgh’s nine Council members absolute control of $100,000 each to be spent on
CDBG eligible projects or programs via special interest groups or organizations in the
neighborhoods each council member represents.  Council office staff will then work with
the Mayor’s office staff to make sure that the funding choices are eligible under CDBG
requirements.  Allocating this money to each Councilmember, effectively frees the mayor
to direct the balance and majority of allocations elsewhere.  In this case, the 2002 CDBG
balance after CDB allocations, was a little more than $20 million dollars.  In other words,
Mayor Murphy obtained or “bought” Council’s support for his CDBG budget by giving
Council control over $900,000 -- a comparatively small amount of CDBG dollars.
Should Council object to the Mayor’s proposed CDBG budget, the Mayor can threaten to
reduce or eliminate Council’s CBO allocations. As a result of CBO allocations, the
passage of Mayor Murphy’s proposed 2002 CDBG budget was relatively easy, as has
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been the passage of all Pittsburgh mayors’ CDBG proposals accompanied by the CBO
system.
Many of these CBO dollars have been allocated to Council members so that they
can support small groups or organizations in the neighborhoods they represent.  By
providing these monies, Council members are able to gain the support and visibility of
the employees and supporters of the neighborhood groups receiving CBO funding. The
Council member who “secured” the CBO monies will likely be supported by the local
grant’s beneficiaries at election time (Bellisario 2005). In Pittsburgh, for example, there
were nearly 140 groups or organizations that received CDBG monies in 2002, with
individual awards ranging from $1,000 for the Children of Love Theater to $250,000 for
the Pittsburgh Community Services Hunger Program (“Consolidated Community
Development Plan” 2002).
Local-level elected officials responsive to national-level elected officials
Local-level elected officials will be responsive to national-level officials so that
they can expedite awards for the local-level and generate publicity for themselves.
Typically, this publicity occurs before an upcoming election so that the legislators can
claim credit for the award and the mayors can start spending the award money.  The
timing of CDBG awards is not coincidental and is always on the minds of both the
federal and local-level officials (Tolbert, HUD).
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Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
With a 2006 operating budget of $3.48 billion dollars (Philadelphia budget office
12/6/05) and a population of 1.5 million residents, the City of Philadelphia is the fifth
most populated city in the United States (“Top 50 cities in the U.S.” 2006). More than 55
percent of Philadelphia’s population is minorities (US Census 2000).
Similar to its big city counterpart to the west, Philadelphia operates under a strong
form of government with its mayor responsible for the administration and operations of
its day-to-day business affairs.  Unlike Pittsburgh, where a mayor can be elected for
unlimited terms, Philadelphia mayors can only hold office for two terms.
There are twice as many registered Democrats as Republicans in the City of
Philadelphia.   Given this ratio, it is not surprising that Philadelphia has not elected a
Republican mayor since the 1940’s (“The Philadelphia Inquirer” 2005).
Similarly, the majority of Philadelphia’s Council members are disproportionately
Democratic; 14 of its current 17 elected members are Democrats (“Chief Clerk of City
Council Office” 2006).  Of Philadelphia’s 17 elected council members, 10 are elected by-
district with the remaining elected at-large.
Philadelphia’s CDBG Program History
Between 1983 and 1998, Philadelphia received CDBG entitlement dollars each
and every year (see appendix F).  During this time, Philadelphia received an average of
$73,341,813 million dollars each year and has never received less than $45 million
dollars in any one calendar year (“Comprehensive plans” 1983 – 1998).  This infusion of
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revenue has given Philadelphia enormous opportunities to improve and modernize the
quality of life for many of its low-income neighborhoods throughout the city.
During the early years of the block grants, the majority of CDBG entitlement
dollars were allocated to housing-related activities such as weatherization and
rehabilitation assistance programs citywide (“Consolidated plans” 1983-1998).  Over the
years and varying administrations, however, CDBG allocations shifted from housing-
related activities to community development initiatives ranging from loans and grants to
facade improvements for small businesses.  This shift in allocations represents a sea
change from the W. Wilson Goode administration (1984-1992) to the Ed Rendell
Administration (1992-2000) and from individual residents to the small businesses within
the community.
As figure 4.5 illustrates, roughly 75 percent of Philadelphia’s 1.5 million residents
live in CD eligible neighborhoods.  Because of this ratio, program supervisors enjoy
immense flexibility in the distribution of CDBG entitlement dollars.
How Philadelphia’s CDBG process works
Under the terms and conditions set forth by HUD, Philadelphia is required to
advertise and hold public meeting so that the public can help determine how and where
CDBG allocations are distributed.  To maximize its efforts in reaching as many citizens
as possible, Philadelphia advertises CDBG meetings at public libraries, newspapers, and
on-line, as well as through direct mailing to community activists and organizations.  Once
these meetings are held, Philadelphia’s City-Council holds public hearings on the
feasibility of each project.
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Figure 4.5
City of Philadelphia CDBG Eligible
Neighborhoods
Source:  City of Philadelphia, Community
              Development Block Grant,
              2000 Census Tracts
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The inherent structure of Philadelphia’s City-Council and the way members are
elected plays a pivotal role in the selection of CDBG federal allocations. The public
hearings and council meetings are “where by-district [Council members] reviews the
project selections to make sure their constituencies and self-interests are being
represented” (Jastrzab 2005).  Council members take advantage of these public meetings
to raise their visibility and popularity among their constituents.
There are seventeen council members on Philadelphia’s City-Council: ten elected
by-district and the remaining seven at-large. Those members elected by-district are more
inclined to push for projects that benefit their individual constituencies.  Conversely,
members elected at-large are most concerned with citywide, larger scale projects that
cross neighborhoods.   As a result, a struggle exists within Council between those
members desiring projects for their own districts and those members who are more
concerned with citywide projects.
Contrasting CDBG Allocations Under Differing Mayoral Administrations
During the early 1980’s, most of Philadelphia’s federal CDBG monies were
allocated toward housing and public improvement projects.  In fact, nearly $10 million
dollars was appropriated for site improvements during the early eighties, compared with
$2.4 million dollars in the following decade.  What accounts for this phenomenon is not
entirely clear, but what is apparent is that monies for community development initiatives
were made much more available during the 1990’s.
As Table 4.6 indicates, the difference in spending patterns between the Goode and
Rendell administrations seems most prominent in housing, community development and
economic development initiatives.  Housing allocations dealt with weatherization and
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rehabilitation issues, community development involved small business loans and
improvements, while economic development dealt with development projects that
benefited the entire community.  Such funding allocations clearly identify a mayor’s
interests and priorities.  According to Table 4.6, Rendell seemed to care more about
community development initiatives -- allocations for such initiatives increased sevenfold
during Rendell’s years in office. The reasons for this large differential is unclear except
for the fact that Rendell may have been trying to raise his overall visibility, not just in
Philadelphia,  but within the region and state, as he was preparing to seek the
gubernatorial nomination.
Symbiotic Model Applied to Philadelphia
Local-level bureaucrats responsive to local-level elected officials
For the most part, Philadelphia maintains a professional and experienced CDBG program
staff.  On the surface, elected politicians in Philadelphia do not appear to play as large a role in
influencing CDBG allocations as do Pittsburgh’s CBO allocations of $100,000 for each council
member.  “Certainly a [Philadelphia] council member that represents a particular district will push
for those projects that can help him, but the allocation recommendations are typically controlled by
the Planning Department” (Jastrzab 2005).
Funding shifts in various CDBG eligible activities suggest that program supervisors are
sensitive to the needs of their mayors and council.  This sensitivity suggests that some type of tacit
agreement exists between bureaucrats and local-level officials and that bureaucrats’ job security is
somehow tied into doing what their bosses want.
100
Table 4.6   Spending Habits between Mayoral Administrations for Philadelphia, Pa.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Significant Funding Differences between Mayoral Administrations







































































Goode 15% 3% 11% 57%   - 11% 1%   - 2%   -   -   -   - 100%
Rendell 15% 6% 6% 44%   - 24%   -   - 5%   -   -   -   - 100%
101
Local-level elected officials responsive to national-level elected officials
What can be seen in Philadelphia, suggests that formula adjustments or expedited awards
do take place during election time or to elevate the visibility of a council member (Tolbert 2005).
These awards are timed to give both the national legislator and the mayor credit for the CDBG.
Put another way, the local-level officials are happy to give the national legislators credit for the
grant, providing they can access the money to fund projects throughout the city, including those
“pet projects” that are important to them (Tolbert 2005).
The size of the award is another determinant in apportioning - -and manipulating -- CDBG
dollars.  Looking at Philadelphia’s CDBG budget, it is often difficult to determine if “pet projects”
are being funded. This is due to the large amount of grant dollars that Philadelphia receives each
year.  Such large sums of money could facilitate program administrators easily hiding “pet
projects” under the guise of the broad categories that are reported to HUD.  Given that funding
allocations can reach $30 million dollars or more for certain activities or categories such as
housing or economic development, there is a greater possibility that manipulation of allocations
could occur as it is extremely difficult to track, through audits or published budget documents,
individual projects that are initiated and carried out within broad categories.
Interviews and Survey Results
In order to understand the behaviors and decision-making processes at the
national, local and bureaucratic levels, interviews were held at each level (see appendix
1).  These interviews were conducted in order to understand motivation and how it
underlies funding decisions.  Unfortunately, a single explanation to under motivation and
behavior of actors does not exist.  Instead, through the use of interviews and surveys, a
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multitude or explanatory variables explain how and why CDBG allocation decisions are
made.
The purpose of these interviews was to evaluate an official’s knowledge and
understanding of the CDBG program. Participants were asked about their ability to
allocate and manipulate CDBG dollars, the impact of citizen participation on allocations,
and the influence of politics in their decision-making process.  Officials were also asked
about their interest in using CDBG monies to support the “pet projects” that are important
to them, and if they believed that the CDBG program was another form of pork-barrel
politics.
National-Level Officials
According to one official from HUD, the CDBG program is an attempt to
revitalize America’s neighborhoods in a nonpartisan, objective way (Tolbert 2005).
Unfortunately, this statement is not entirely accurate.  Although it is true that the CDBG
program awards monies to entitlement cities regardless of the party in power, it is the
process by which awards are distributed that encourages partisan influence. This process
can expedite or delay the execution of CDBG funds.  An expedited award allows federal
dollars to flow into the cities more quickly, while a delayed award can impede the
projects and programs that depend upon federal dollars to continue. In other words, by
strategically announcing an award prior to or after an election, the national-level official
can enhance or diminish his or her reputation and reelection efforts, which, in turn, can
materially affect the progress or attenuation of a CDBG funded project.
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In addition to the ability to manipulate the timing of CDBG awards, legislators
exert political influence by “tweaking” program formulas (Tolbert 2005).  As discussed
in chapter 4, the formula that determines the eligibility of a local community is based on
a city’s population, persons in poverty and number of overcrowded housing units
(“NCDA Washington Report” 2002). A legislator that represents an area that has a higher
level of overcrowded housing than of citizens clearly living beneath the poverty line, for
example, will try to “tip” or change the formula to the advantage of her constituency.
Even a small change in the federal CDBG formula can translate into millions of
additional entitlement dollars for a legislator’s district.
Not surprisingly, the suggestion that elected legislators manipulate the CDBG
formula was met with resistance and cautious acknowledgement - resistance in its
implications that federal officials use the CDBG program for personal gain and visibility
and cautious acknowledgement that some “tweaking” does occur to bring more monies
into specific neighborhoods for specific projects. The elected official asserted that his
responsibility is to “grow the pie” and ensure that the federal government continues to
fund the block grant program.  When asked about his role in selecting and approving
individual projects, the national legislator insisted that the distribution of CDBG dollars
are determined by city officials and their stakeholders without any pressure or influence
from his office  (Doyle 2006).
Local-Level Officials
Of the local-level officials that agreed to be interviewed from Sharon, Altoona,
Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, I was surprised by their overall sophistication and
understanding of the federally funded CDBG program.  Although some younger and
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more inexperienced council members and relatively new mayors did not understand the
limitations and guidelines of the program, even the most recently hired or elected
officials seemed to grasp its overall potential and implications for their communities --
the influx of substantial federal dollars.
Unfortunately, not all council members took full advantage of CDBG monies
when offered to them. Former Pittsburgh mayor Sophie Masloff stated that when she was
on City-Council, she understood that each member controlled one hundred thousand
CDBG dollars, through the CBO line item, to use in their respective neighborhoods and
that some of her colleagues would fail to expend their annual allocations (Masloff 2003).
As a result, she would sometimes barter for another council member’s allocations by
trading a legislative vote or favor.  Masloff believed she could capitalize on the
inexperience and lack of understanding of her council counterparts by redirecting another
council member’s allocations to the neighborhoods she represented.
Of the mayors and council members that agreed to be interviewed, many
acknowledged that the success of the CDBG program was tied to the level of community
participation (Price 2003, Murphy 2005).  Unfortunately, obtaining public participation is
difficult to achieve at best.  Although some mayors have taken a proactive approach in
trying to reach the communities they represent, most mayors agreed that they did not or
do not have the time or the means to coordinate all the initiatives that would ensure
maximum community participation. Rather, they suggest that the responsibility of




The duties of a CDBG program supervisor are to “manage the administration of
the Community Development Block Grant programs, including contract management,
labor compliance and fiscal operations; develop and implement approved policies, goals
and priorities for the allocation of funds; oversees grant sub-recipient application
processing and eligibility determinations; oversees the federal auditing process”
(“Community Development Program Supervisor job description” 1995).  These duties
clearly indicate the role of the bureaucratic-level official.
Keeping their role in mind, bureaucratic-level leaders were asked about their
overall understanding of the CDBG program, the influence of politics on the program,
and the amount of program flexibility that they were afforded.  Without exception, all
CDBG program supervisors felt that their primary responsibilities were to act as an agent
for the mayor and City-Council, in order to balance the legal demands and political
pressures of the program.  Program supervisors believed that much of their liaison work
centered on negotiating among the needs, desires and demands of the political and elected
leaders, of the citizenry, and of special interest groups.  Given the different needs,
agendas and desires of each different office, body or group, the job of a CDBG program
supervisor was difficult at best and seemingly impossible at times (Hargrove and
Glidewell 1990).
Most bureaucratic-level leaders defined their seemingly impossible role as
enforcers of the programs rules and regulations, not as the body of government that
decides which program gets funded or how much.  CDBG program supervisors insisted
that funding decisions were left with the local and national leaders and that they had little
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authority over final project selections.  Bureaucratic leaders perceived themselves as the
professional branch of the CDBG allocation cycle and their sole function was to serve as
the resident expert in determining program eligibility and requirements.  In other words,
of the supervisors/bureaucrats who agreed to be interviewed do not see themselves as
facilitating a mayor’s or council-member’s political agenda/reelection bids; nor do they
see themselves as officials who can secure their jobs by advocating for certain CDBG
allocations.
All bureaucratic level officials agreed that the direct role and impact of
community groups played a lesser role than expected in the allocation of CDBG monies.
Although program supervisors are responsible for organizing and scheduling meetings for
community input, most program supervisors believe this exercise is basically a waste of
time (Johnson 2005).  In short, bureaucratic leaders believe that community meetings are
a ruse, are held to satisfy HUD requirements, offer little of value, and are largely a waste
of time and money.
When asked about changing and improving the CDBG program, most program
supervisors expressed frustration of their bosses’ level of understanding of the program
and the processes that must be following to make a programming change:
Sometimes I get a telephone call from the Mayor’s Office telling me to
switch funding from one CDBG eligible program to another.  Although we
are able to reprogram the dollars, they [Mayor’s office or City-Council]
want immediate access to these monies.  What they [Mayor’s office or
City-Council] don’t understand is that it can take months to change.  I may
need to publicly advertise the change or get council approval.  The
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implications of them [Mayor’s Office or City-Council] changing their
minds creates a lot of work for my office and delays in getting official
approval. (Bellisario 2005).
Overall, the bureaucratic-level officials see themselves as the non-political
enforcers of the CDBG program.  They strive to be the mediator between the local-level
officials who decide which projects to fund and the program interpreters who explain
HUD rules and regulations.  In other words, according to their own assessment of the
CDBG process, the bureaucratic-level officials advise their bosses of those projects that
are eligible or ineligible to fund.  They do not make the allocation decisions.
Conclusion and Findings
As Table 4.7 indicates, there were noticeable differences between the overall
value of community participation among all three levels.  Despite the fact that community
groups are required (by HUD) to participate in the budgeting and allocation process (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development 2003), both the program supervisors at
the bureaucratic-level and HUD officials at the national-level believed that the decision-
making process rarely considers the input of community participation.  This perspective
is contrary to the mayors’ and council members’ emphatic claims that community
participation is the key to the success of the CDBG program and that the project
recommendations that their offices support are a direct result of listening to the
community and responding to their needs (Udin 2005).
Of those local-level officials interviewed, the perception of the programs’
purposes was most notable.  The program supervisors believe that the CDBG program is
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just another form of pork-barrel politics providing self-interested politician with the
programmatic means to manipulate monies (Bellisario 2005). This perspective was very
different than the local and national-level officials, who claim to believe that the CDBG
dollars was not a pork-barrel program.  Interestingly, of the local and national level
officials interviewed, most agreed that the CDBG dollars help further their personal “pet
projects,” that are important to the constituencies they represent, and not necessarily
important to their own reelection interests.
Of the program supervisors interviewed, most believed that many of the ultimate
allocations were another form of “pork-barrel” politics.  The CDBG program supervisor
for the City of Pittsburgh suggested that it is not unusual to see monies diverted to more
highly visible public improvement projects before an election only to be reverted back to
other lower profile projects after an incumbent official secures reelection.  For example,
in each of Mayor Murphy’s reelection bids, some notable spending shifts emerged,
namely increased spending for city-wide public improvement projects. In 1994, Mayor
Murphy spent a little more than 5 percent of his CDBG budget on public improvement
projects.  By 1997, that number increased, staggeringly: to 22.58 percent.  After Murphy
secured reelection, in 1998, public improvement allocations dropped back to 17 percent,
only to incrementally increase to more than 25 percent in 2001 (See Chart 4.1).  The
perception that Mayor Murphy shifted allocations based on reelection considerations was
confirmed by Murphy himself when interviewed. When asked about his practice of
redirecting monies to public improvement projects prior to election time, the Pittsburgh
mayor asserted that “the reality of expenditures is that politics drive [CDBG] allocations”
(Murphy 2005).
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Murphy was not alone in this shifting of CDBG monies prior to election time.  In
Philadelphia, economic development allocations were significantly higher during Mayor
Goode’s first term in office compared with his second term in office (see Chart 4.2).
Since economic development dollars are often linked to the development of large-scale
and highly visible capital improvement projects, CDBG allocations are often higher
during a mayor’s first term in office.  Considering that a 1 percent differential in
economic development dollars could translate into millions of dollars, the motivations to
manipulate allocations are apparent. In other words, by shifting even a small percentage
of monies to high profile projects, a mayor can significantly bolster his or her visibility
and popularity among constituents.
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Are you familiar with the
CDBG program? Yes Yes Yes
Do you select and approve
CDBG projects? No Yes Yes
Do you use CDBG funds
for "pet projects?" No Yes No
Is CDBG another form of
pork-barrel politics? Yes No Yes/No
Do community groups
influence CDBG
allocations? No Yes No
Do you feel accountable to
community groups? No Yes No
Is the CDBG program free
from political influence? No No Yes/No
*HUD officials and/or congressional staffers.
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The allocation shifts from CDBG targeted neighborhoods to community-wide
activities (economic development and public improvements) that can be seen to occur in
direct relation to election cycles, directly reduce the number of targeted programs that are
offered in low and moderate-income neighborhoods.  This means that job creation
programs, rehabilitation of senior citizen centers in low and moderate income
communities, and overall neighborhood improvements are not being made in the areas
the federal government intended for the money to go.  Although it is hard to say with
certainty which specific programs or projects are being affected, it is fair to say that
substantial sums of monies are being diverted from targeted neighborhood projects to
city-wide projects that benefit all communities regardless of their income level.
Although the diverted funds are popular with the higher-income public (and the ability to
divert funds is an intriguing option with elected officials), the low and moderate-income
constituencies are being harmed by the manipulation of CDBG monies for political
visibility and gain.
The next chapter will determine if the lessons learned from Sharon, Altoona,
Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania can be applied at a national level. By
quantitatively examining the data and contextual factors of each entitlement community
within the United States, I hope to explain that the patterns and hypotheses learned from
Pennsylvania are representative of the way elected officials allocate federal community
development block grant (CDBG) dollars throughout the entire country.
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Chart 4.1





























Source:  Cost control budgets for City of Pittsburgh Cost Control Budgets
for CDBG allocations 1994 – 2001.
Chart 4.2



























Source:  Cost control budgets for City of Philadelphia Cost Control Budgets
for CDBG allocations 1984 – 1991.
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Chapter Five
Quantitative Analysis of National Data
Introduction
In chapter four, a case study of four Pennsylvania cities was conducted that
examined the ways cities and their mayor’s allocated CDBG dollars.  These allocations
were made by examining the symbiotic model and through the use of stakeholder
interviews and surveys.  These interviews revealed that big cities allocate federal dollars
differently than smaller cities for political, social and economic differences.
Additionally, electoral concerns also seemed to play a role in how elected officials
disburse CDBG monies.
The results of these interviews are linked to existing research on the distributive
politics model.  As stated earlier in this study, research on distribution politics must
investigate not only the types of projects funded, but also why officials fund projects the
way they do.  To see if the lessons from the case study data are applicable to the national
data, I looked at more than 35 independent variables that tests areas ranging from poverty
levels to racial characteristics to city size.  These independent variables were correlated
with the six standard dependent variables that are reported by HUD (see Table 3.1).  By
comparing funding allocations for each depended variable, it is possible to identify any
political, social or economic indicators of how CDBG monies are distributed.
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a more sophisticated and comprehensive
framework, one that contains 2001 data from every CDBG entitlement city in all 50
United States, including the District of Columbia, that received CDBG monies directly
from the federal government.  The data is not a representative sampling of entitlement
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cites, rather the actual allocations by functional categories that were reported by each
recipient jurisdiction.  The reported data was obtained from HUD, the 2000 U.S. Census,
Municipal Yellow Book, interviews, surveys, and from the internal administrative
documents of entitlement communities.
Analysis and Interpretation
To see if any of the contextual or independent variables were significant, I used
analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA): ANOVA
to test whether three or more groups have overall different means, MANOVA to test if a
change in an independent variable impacts the dependent variable.  This is an ideal
technique for hypothesis testing since it compares the mean allocations for each
dependent variable with one another.  The major advantage of ANOVA testing is that the
results are easier to explain and allows the data to be analyzed as categorical. For
example, if we are interested in the relationship between living in the southern part of the
United States and the allocation of CDBG dollars for economic development, we would
first see if an overall variance in the means’ exists for all regions.  If we are interested in
testing the relationship between multiple independent variables such as form of
government and size of city on the allocation of CDBG public improvement dollars, we
would employ a MANOVA. By examining the strength of multivariate relationships, it is
possible to identify the interactions of the independent variables and its corresponding
associations to the dependent variables.  In short, this analysis tests each of the
independent variables that have a relationship with the dependent variables (see
Appendix H), to determine if the individual relationships hold true in a multivariate
context.  At no time were any variables added or removed from this analysis to alter or
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changes any statistical results.
Before we examine the various relationships between the dependent and
independent variables, it is helpful to observe the national CDBG allocations for each of
the six dependent variables: acquisition, administration and planning, economic
development, housing, public improvements and public services (See chart 5.3).  These
categories will provide a perspective regarding the mean or average amount of federal
CDBG dollars being allocated to the cities.  To address these relationships, I tested a
series of related hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 - Region
The first hypothesis pertains to geographical region; I hypothesize that
geographical region impacts the funding levels of CDBG projects for both large and
small entitlement cities within the United States.  This hypothesis suggests that since
some areas have stronger economic and employment situations, there are large variations
in the allocations of economic development and housing initiatives. This hypothesis can
be tested by comparing the CDBG allocations of every CDBG entitlement city in the
United States by region, regardless of size, and place it in the appropriate region
category.
By studying region, it is possible to explain how and why elected local officials,
namely mayors and city-council members, distribute CDBG allocations.  Region
considers the value of the culture of the population, as well as the economic and political
environments of the area.  The cultural perspective suggests that behavior is driven by
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Chart 5.3                    U.S. Average CDBG Allocations

















beliefs and examines how these emotions can influence various behaviors.   Groups,
peers and professional associations can inspire or reinforce these emotionally-informed
behaviors causing a decision-maker to act out of various motivations and aspirations
ranging from the “ideal” to the “quest for power” (Browning & Jacob 1964).
An understanding of a region and its population could have an influence on how
and why CDBG monies are allocated.  The demographics of a city’s population, age, and
income levels can allow officials to plan for city services that cater to their targeted
residents.  From an economic and political perspective, a region’s tax base, property
values, fiscal inequity, racial balance and job opportunities are salient considerations of a
particular geographical area.  A region that is most concerned with attracting more
business and employment opportunities, for example, will have different funding
priorities than an area that is interested in rehabilitating its housing stock.
From a demographic perspective, region turned out to be one of the most
significant indicators of CDBG allocations.  For nearly every coefficient or category in
my analysis, region was a key influence in the allocations for economic development,
housing, public improvements and public services.  These findings were not surprising,
however, since these categories considered a city’s unique blend of contextual factors
coupled with the cultural composition of its community.
Age and condition of a city’s infrastructure was another determinant in the
distribution of federal CDBG monies.  This determinant was especially clear in the older,
northeastern cities in the United States where deteriorating roads and crumbling sewer
systems seemed to dominate the public improvement categories.  The concern over aging
infrastructures was made most clear in an interview with Pittsburgh’s CDBG program
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supervisor:  “Whenever you deal with older streets, you never know what you’re going to
come across.  As a result, the cost to replace and repair can be quite high and we must
allocate [CDBG] monies accordingly” (Bellisario 2005).  This sentiment suggests that
CDBG program supervisors understand the cities they work for and the financial
implications of dealing with crumbling infrastructure through CDBG allocation
decisions.
Culture and its relationship to region was another factor that influenced the
allocation of CDBG monies. Rooted in a person’s past experiences and belief systems,
the common cultural characteristics of a community, such as ethnicity or religion, play a
salient role in defining an entitlement community’s behaviors, attitudes and belief
systems.  In addition to the impact of cultural identification, the political culture of a
particular region, known as sectionalism, and identified by the political ties and electoral
behavior of a group of people (Elazar 1993), also impacts how CDBG dollars are spent,
distributed and used.  If the people of a particular community are weary of stringent
federal oversight, for example, they may be reluctant to accept the terms of the national
grant.  Conversely, a community that is less threatened by the “strong arm” of the federal
government may be more inclined to accept the terms and conditions of a distributive
grant.
The economics of a particular region also influence the allocation of CDBG
monies.  A healthy region, with a prosperous community and a growing population, is
more inclined to dedicate federal dollars to economic development projects such as new
housing developments or industry. A struggling region, on the other hand, will be more
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focused on quality of life issues such as weatherization programs or child care assistance
for its community.
My first hypothesis asks whether geographical region impact CDBG allocation
levels for both large and small entitlement cities.  To establish whether this hypothesis is
accurate, I compared the mean funding levels for each of the four geographical regions
within the United States: Midwest, Southern, Northeast, and Western.  Table 5.8 shows
the results of a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test.  ANOVA was used to test
the overall significance of region for each of the six dependent variables:  acquisition,
administrative and planning, economic development, housing, public improvements, and
public service allocations.  The null hypothesis for each of the dependent variables is that
the dependent variable does not vary by region at a .05 level of significance.  The results
of these comparisons show that the housing, public improvement, and public services
coefficients are below a .05 level of significance, so we reject the null hypothesis and
conclude that some type of relationship does indeed exist for region. For example, the
mean CDBG allocation for housing in the Midwest is nearly 39 percent while the western
region of the United States can expect only a little more than a 25 percent allocation.  It
should be noted that the significance of region must be discounted since it often masks
other significant variables (such as economic differences, demographics, and political
variables) that appears to make region seem more statistically significant than it is.  These
additional variables will be factored in when the MANOVA analysis is performed on
region.
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Hypothesis 2 – City Size
A second hypothesis pertains to the affects of population and size of city that
influences an officials’ decision to allocate CDBG dollars.   I hypothesize that there are
differences between how CDBG dollars are allocated within small and large cities. This
hypothesis suggests that there are considerable differences in the way CDBG monies are
allocated, because in small entitlement cities, the electoral challenges and need to fund
highly visible projects are not as salient as in larger cities.  This hypothesis can be tested
by comparing CDBG allocations for small, medium and large entitlement cities.
When it comes to CDBG funding decisions, size does matter.  Smaller cities do
not face the same political and bureaucratic constraints as larger cities since larger cities
tend to elect more representatives than their small city counterparts.  New York, for
example, elects fifty one council members while Cleveland elects only seven council
representatives (National League of Cities 2005).  The data in this study suggests that, in
cities with larger groups of elected officials, the competing demands for CDBG dollars
are more numerous and more complicated, creating more difficulties with the efficient
allocation of CDBG monies.  Smaller cities with fewer elected officials do not face such
a complexity of potentially competing interests and can more easily allocate their CDBG
dollars.
The competing interest groups of larger cities often come in the form of special
interest groups or organizations.  In Pittsburgh, for example, there were nearly one
hundred forty groups or organizations that received CDBG monies in 2002 with
individual awards ranging from $1,000 to the Children of Love Theater to $250,000 for
the Pittsburgh Community Services Hunger Program (City of Pittsburgh Consolidated
121
Community Development Plan” 2002).  Due to the sheer quantity of competing interest
groups and the need to appease as many people as possible, large cities try to spread their
CDBG allocation in as many directions as possible while smaller cities will usually
allocate money to one or two initiatives or projects.
Interestingly, larger cities have more flexibility in allocating monies to special
interest groups or projects since they can “hide” them under large funding umbrellas that
make auditing tasks more difficult.  Since smaller cities tend to receive smaller grants, it
is more difficult for them to hide or reallocate federal monies to special projects without
raising flags regarding the appropriateness of their expenditures (Tolbert 2005).
A very strong correlation between public improvement projects and size of city
also produced some convincing data regarding the saliency of city size.  According to
Chart 5.4, very small cities, on average, allocate 30 percent of their CDBG budget to
public improvements.  As the size of the city increases, the percentage of the CDBG
budget allocated to public improvements drops accordingly.  Therefore, while a very
small city with a population of less than 75,000, for example, would allocate 30 percent
of its CDBG monies to public improvement projects, a much larger city with a population
of 500,000 people would allocate, on the average, thirteen percent less of its CDBG
money to public improvement projects.  These findings are consistent with the notion that
smaller cities do not have the resources to fund these public improvement projects
without the help of federal grant dollars.  Larger cities, on the other hand, that have a
larger tax base to pay for public improvement are thus more inclined to use CDBG
monies for other initiatives, such as economic development projects.
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The size of a city can have a direct impact upon the level of services and the
economic health of a city.   A city that has a large population and tax base is likely to
possess expensive equipment to perform infrastructure maintenance.  A smaller city with
a smaller population and less tax revenue is not likely to own such expensive public
maintenance equipment.  In Pittsburgh, for example, the City owns and operates an
asphalt plant that can produce enough asphalt to pave as many roads as it wishes.
Because it owns and operates its own asphalt facility, Pittsburgh can produce street
resurfacing materials for a fraction of what it will cost a smaller city to purchase such
materials (Murphy 2005).  In other words, a larger city’s tax base and resources may
allow for higher levels of services which are unavailable to smaller cities collecting fewer
taxes from their smaller populations.
From an economic perspective, cities that have a high proportion of
unemployment coupled with a small population are going to have a more difficult time
serving the needs of their communities.  Conversely, more affluent communities with
high tax bases can provide considerable services and amenities to their constituents.  The
population or size of a city and the concomitant availability of resources can and do
significantly affect the CDBG allocation decisions made by federal and local officials.
Similar to region, I also employed an ANOVA test to measure the saliency of this
data.   According to table 5.9, there is a significant relationship for public improvement
allocations and city size for the public allocation coefficients and for very large cities in
the public service coefficients.  There were not statistically significant relationships
among the remaining categories.  On can therefore conclude that city size does indeed
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matter in the allocation of public improvement type projects and that public service
allocations are significant for very large cities.
Hypothesis 3 – Form of Government
Another hypothesis pertains to the political relationship between a mayor and its elected
council persons or alderman.  I hypothesize that in cities that are managed by a
council/manager framework, the allocation of CDBG dollars are significantly different
than the allocation of CDBG dollars for mayor/council, commissioner, or town manager
systems. This hypothesis can be tested by comparing the CDBG allocations of
council/manager cities with other forms of government.
The way in which a city exerts its powers over a political community is
commonly referred to as form of government (“Form of Government” 2006).  There are
four four dominant forms of government in the United States: council/manager,
mayor/council, commissioner and town manager.  Of the 758 CDBG entitlement cities
examined in this study, there were 735 (421 council/manager, 299 mayor/council, 15
Commisoner) dominant forms of government.  There were 323 cities that did not indicate
their political framworks or had government structures that did not fit into a council
manager/mayor category (“National League of Cities”  2005).
• Council / Manager
In the council-manager form of government, a professional city manager is the key
administrator responsible for the day-to-day activities of municipal services. In this
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form of government, the city is considered to operate within a weak-mayor environment.
In a council-manager framework, the elected officials are the policy makers and leaders
of the community and are viewed as the mouthpieces of the community at-large.  The
appointed manager is charged with the responsibility of carrying out the policies and
wishes of the elected officials.   The manager is responsible for preparing the operating
and capital budgets, hiring and firing staff, serving as the elected body’s chief advisor,
and executing policy recommendations and initiatives.  If the professional manager does
not execute the policies and priorities of the elected officials, the elected body has the
authority and power to terminate the manager’s position.
The mayor typically presides at public meetings, solicits citizen input, and
communicates policy recommendations to the city manager.  In a weak mayor
environment, the mayor is viewed more as a ceremonial and policy figure (who, for
example, presides over council, facilitates communications between elected and
appointed officials, cuts ribbons and kisses babies), and less as a professional manager
who oversees the routine delivery of public services.
• Mayor /Council
In the mayor-council form of government, the mayor is charged with the
responsibility of running the day-to-day operations of city government.  In this form
of government, the city is considered to operate within a strong-mayor environment.
In this scenario, the elected mayor is the policy-maker, administrator and voice of the
community and is accountable to both the electorate and city-council.  Such
accountability is regarded as providing useful checks and balances situation.  Council
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serves as the community’s legislative body, while the mayor is responsible for the
overall administration of the city.  In this form of government, council focuses on
community goals, large-scale operational and capital improvement projects, zoning,
land use and long-term strategic planning goals.
• Commissioner
In a commissioner form of government, the powers of running city government
are shared among a panel of elected officials called commissioners.  These
commissioners are usually responsible for the development of the budget and ordinances.
Typically, commissioners are found in very small communities.
As indicated in table 5.10, an ANOVA was used to test the overall significance of
form of government for each of the six dependent variables, with form of government as
the factor.  The evidence suggests that economic development is below a .05 level of
significance. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that some type of
significant relationship for the council-manager (weak-mayor) coefficient for the
economic development category.  All other categories and coefficients did not prove to
be significant.
From a political perspective, the only contextual variable that proved statistically
significant in the allocation of CDBG dollars was the mayor-council (strong mayor) form
of government and this proved significant only for economic development initiatives.
This coefficient suggests that economic development allocations increase an average of
2.2 percent (from 4.5 percent to 6.7 percent) when a mayor-council form of government
prevails.  Why would a strong-mayor factor affect economic development initiatives and
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not the other allocation areas?  One possible explanation is that in a strong-mayor
environment, where the incumbent mayor is typically interested in seeking reelection
and/or raising her visibility, she will try to influence bureaucratic managers or agents to
allocate monies for projects that are popular among her constituency.
Hypothesis 4 – How City-Council is Elected
A fourth hypothesis pertains to the way council members are elected by their
constituents.  I hypothesize that in large entitlement cities, when city council members
are elected by district, more federal dollars are allocated to neighborhood-specific or
smaller scale projects, thereby greatly improving each council member s visibility and
reelection chances.  Conversely, when city council members are elected at-large, CDBG
dollars are allocated to citywide projects because the ability to get reelected depends
upon satisfying a broader constituency.  When council members are elected both at-large
and by district, monies are more evenly allocated throughout the community leading to a
more balanced distribution of CDBG dollars.  These hypotheses can be tested by
comparing the CDBG allocations made by large entitlement cities that elect their council
members by district, at-large or by a combination of by-district and at-large.
The appointment of most city-council members are made three ways: elected by-
district, elected at-large, or elected both by-district and at-large.  When a council person
represents a particular district within a community, the implication of CDBG allocation
decisions can very significantly.
When a council person is elected by-district, it is not uncommon for that
representative to “push” a project in her district.  This strategy stems from a
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representative’s desire to claim credit for the project and to be remembered at reelection
time.  When a council person is elected at-large, the focus is on bigger and longer term
projects since the elected member is accountable to the entire electorate as opposed to a
particular voting district.  Such bigger and longer term projects may include a major
bridge repair or the rehabilitation of a centralized recreation center that consumes a large
portion of the CDBG budget for that year.  Finally, when council members are elected
by-district and at-large, it is more likely that a mixture of large scale and smaller,
neighborhood specific projects will be funded (Bellisario 2006).
Typically, council members who are elected at-large are more inclined to
recommend and approve projects that service the entire community.  A council member
who is elected by-district, however, are more inclined to push for projects that service
those constituents who elected her.  Although mayors ultimately control the allocation of
CDBG dollars, the need for a mayor to understand a council person’s motivations and
priorities is imperative before a federal grant is allocated.  A council member elected by-
district will be most concerned with a select group of constituents.  On the other hand, a
council member who is accountable to an entire community will have very different goals
in choosing which projects to fund.  As a result, a mayor interested in reelection must
appreciate the need to balance her own self-interest with the needs and interests of her
fellow elected officials.
Table 5.11 shows the results of the ANOVA to test this hypothesis.  At a .05
significance level, there was no evidence to suggest that any of the six dependent
variables had a statistical significance for the way council is elected.
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Hypothesis 5 - Economics
A fifth hypothesis pertains to the affect of wealth of a community and the
significance of per capita income, poverty levels, unemployment rates and housing values
in determining CDBG allocations.  I hypothesize that wealthier cities allocate CDBG
dollars differently than poorer cities do.    My hypothesis suggests that wealthier cities
direct more money to economic development projects to maintain and enhance overall
property values throughout the city and less money to improving substandard housing
because there is less of a need to offer financial assistance to low and moderate income
residents. This hypothesis can be tested by examining the median housing value, per
capita income, unemployment rates and the percentage of city residents living in poverty
for each CDBG entitlement city.
From an economic perspective, the most important indicators for CDBG
allocations were per capita income and median housing values.  These indicators suggest
that as per capita income and housing values rise, so do a city’s CDBG allocations for
acquiring property and investing in a community’s housing stock.  In other words, cities
with high incomes and property values are more inclined to acquire as many blighted
properties in their communities as possible for redevelopment purposes.  The reasons for
this behavior are unclear, but it may be that reversing the decline in one part of a city
helps improve the property values throughout the city.
To address this hypothesis, I ran several one-way ANOVA’s to test the influence
of per capita income, poverty levels, unemployment rates and housing values within the
entitlement community.   For the per capita income ANOVA in Table 5.12, there was
strong evidence that public service allocations are associated at the .01 level for all
130
income groups.  Similarly, a relationship for economic development at the .05 level
indicated that a much higher allocation is made for economic development initiatives
when a community’s per capita income is less than $18,000.  For housing, as the per
capita income of a community increases, the expected average CDBG allocation will
increase by nearly 33 percent.  This test statistic proved significant at the .01 level.
For poverty levels, the data was consistent with the per capita income analysis for
economic development.  According to the ANOVA performed in Table 5.13, when the
poverty levels are low (below 8.8 percent of a community), there is less money given to
economic develop initiatives than when poverty levels are high.  This data suggests that
the more the amount of poverty in a community is directly related to the allocation of
CDBG dollars for economic development activities.
When unemployment rates are compared, the ANOVA in table 5.14 showed that
less money will go to economic development allocations when unemployment is lower
compared with higher unemployment rates.  This data proved significant at the .05 levels
Similarly, housing allocations received significantly more CDBG dollars when
unemployment rates ranged between 3.1 and 3.8 percent, than when unemployment rates
were 3.9 percent or higher.
For housing values, CDBG allocations proved statistically significant for public
services at the .01 level.  According to table 5.15, the ANOVA showed that public
service allocations averaged 10.69 percent when a house was valued at $75,000 or less
compared with a 13.62 percent allocation when a house was valued at $150,000 or more.
This analysis proved significant at a .01 level.
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Hypothesis 6 - Race
My last hypothesis pertains to the affect of race on the allocations of CDBG
allocations.  I hypothesize that cities with higher percentages of whites allocate CDBG
monies differently than cities with greater percentages of non-white populations?  I
hypothesize that greater CDBG program allocations are earmarked to housing and public
service areas that maintain large minority populations. This hypothesis can be tested by
comparing the funding levels of housing and public service categories for minority and
non-minority populations.
There has been considerable speculation from sociologists regarding the impact of
race and ethnicity on the allocation of CDBG dollars (Kettle 1980).   The question
becomes: does race and the potentially accompanying prejudice, discrimination or
stereotyping matter in how and why federal dollars are distributed.  Because of these
racial concerns, it is important to see if a relationship exists between funding and racial
demographics – are there significant differences between the levels and uses of funding
in predominantly white communities and the levels and uses of funding in non-white
communities?
My final research hypothesis suggests that cities with higher concentration of
white populations allocate CDBG monies differently than non-white communities. From
a social perspective, race plays a salient role in the allocation and distribution of CDBG
monies for the public improvement and public services categories.  For property and
economic development initiatives, race is an especially significant allocation determinant
for black and Hispanic communities.   Since many minority populations have lower per
capita incomes and reside in areas where property values are low, it is reasonable to
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conclude that a city’s ability to acquire and develop inexpensive property becomes an
irresistible temptation for an entitlement community.  This perspective raises many
questions:  Are cities getting/using CDBG monies to acquire land in low income, black
and Hispanic neighborhoods with the intention of developing these areas to improve
housing and services for that community or for other purposes and beneficiaries?  Are
cities that apply for CDBG monies claiming that they will use these monies for housing
and services in low income/minority areas then using the monies in other areas?  Are
cities requesting CDBG monies for low income/minority areas to improve housing and
services, then “gentrifying” these areas to the point that the low income, minority
residents are “priced out” and must leave?
Race is also a factor among the registered voters of a community.  Since voter
turnout is traditionally lower in minority communities, and since elected officials are
always looking for ways to improve their reelection chances (Mayhew 1979), elected
officials are more inclined to be more responsive to, and to target programs for the
population that can benefit them directly.  In other words, both federal and city officials
may be tempted to direct CDBG monies to projects in neighborhoods that can reciprocate
with votes.
The ANOVA showed two distinct results.  As indicated in Table 5.9, cities that
have a white population less than 59.2 percent are more inclined to allocate greater
monies to economic development initiatives than cities with greater white populations.
Surprisingly, cities tend to allocate less CDBG monies to housing initiatives when the
non-white population is high.  As the white population increases, the data shows that
housing allocations significantly increase. According to the data, a city that has a white
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population of less than 59.2 percent can expect about 25 percent of its CDBG budget go
towards housing initiatives.  By the time the white population reaches 85 percent, the
average housing allocation is more than 31 percents of a city’s CDBG budget.  This
difference may not seem great, but when a city is allocating tens of millions of dollars
towards a particular funding area, a six percent allocation change can represent millions
of dollars.
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Table 5.8         Comparisons of CDBG funding allocations for Regional influences
        Significance
        Level for Mean
     Mean  SD Score Difference  n
Acquisition comparisons
 Midwest    5.56%  7.88  ----  168
 Southern    6.65%  10.29  ----  201
 Northeastern   6.42%  9.73  ----  177
 Western    5.83%  12.94  ----  212




 Midwest    15.11%  6.90  ----  168
 Southern    16.27%  7.95  ----  201
 Northeastern   16.37%  7.08  ----  177
 Western    15.92%  7.41  ----  212




 Midwest    6.15%  10.79  ----  168
 Southern    5.40%  11.44  ----  201
 Northeastern   6.15%  8.99  ----  177
 Western    4.08%  7.59  ----  212




 Midwest    38.17% *(2,3,4) 36.59  .05  168
 Southern    31.13%  20.86  .01  201
 Northeastern   26.14%  17.67  .01  177
 Western    25.67%  19.02  .01  212




 Midwest    23.39%*(4) 19.11  ----  168
 Southern    27.25%  24.36  ----  201
 Northeastern   28.55%  20.16  ----  177
 Western    29.83%  22.53  .05  212




 Midwest    11.79%  6.63  ----  168
 Southern    10.18%*(3,4) 6.87  ----  201
 Northeastern   13.46%  7.51  .01  177
 Western    13.41%  7.82  ----  212





Table 5.9           Comparisons of CDBG funding allocations for size of city influences
Significance
Level for Mean
Mean SD Score Difference n
Acquisition comparisons
Very Small (under 75k) 6.01% 10.81 ---- 420
Small (75k – 150k) 5.65% 10.69 ---- 211
Medium (150k – 250k) 7.28% 9.32 ---- 63
Large (250k – 500k) 6.34% 8.78 ---- 36
Very Large (5500k +) 8.53% 9.28 ---- 28




Very Small (under 75k) 16.10% 7.82 ---- 420
Small (75k – 150k) 15.87% 7.64 ---- 211
Medium (150k – 250k) 16.01% 5.06 ---- 63
Large (250k – 500k) 14.88% 6.49 ---- 36
Very Large (5500k +) 15.30% 4.55 ---- 28




Very Small (under 75k) 5.08% 9.75 ---- 420
Small (75k – 150k) 5.15% 10.75 ---- 211
Medium (150k – 250k) 5.85% 8.69 ---- 63
Large (250k – 500k) 7.00% 7.53 ---- 36
Very Large (5500k +) 8.22% 7.26 ---- 28




Very Small (under 75k) 29.66% 28.53 ---- 420
Small (75k – 150k) 30.01% 20.33 ---- 211
Medium (150k – 250k) 30.18% 17.81 ---- 63
Large (250k – 500k) 32.92% 14.64 ---- 36
Very Large (5500k +) 30.82% 12.84 ---- 28




Very Small (under 75k) 30.05%*(5) 23.51 .01 420
Small (75k – 150k) 25.95% 20.48 ---- 211
Medium (150k – 250k) 23.28% 18.00 ---- 63
Large (250k – 500k) 21.32% 14.61 ---- 36
Very Large (5500k +) 16.20% 15.04 ---- 28




Very Small (under 75k) 11.64%*(5) 7.88 .05 420
Small (75k – 150k) 12.75% 6.61 ---- 211
Medium (150k – 250k) 12.32% 6.64 ---- 63
Large (250k – 500k) 12.70% 5.65 ---- 36
Very Large (5500k +) 15.73 7.26 ---- 28





Table 5.10        Comparisons of CDBG funding allocations for form of government influences
        Significance
        Level for Mean
     Mean  SD Score Difference  n
Acquisition comparisons
 Council-Manager   6.16%  11.47  ----  421
 Mayor-Council   6.26%  9.25  ----  299
 Commissioner   5.56%  7.59  ----  15




 Council-Manager   16.08%  8.21  ----  421
 Mayor-Council   15.91%  6.16  ----  299
 Commissioner   12.47%  4.71  ----  15




 Council-Manager   4.55%*(3) 9.31  .05  421
 Mayor-Council   6.81%  10.63  ----  299





 Council-Manager   31.38%  28.50  ----  421
 Mayor-Council   28.21%  18.00  ----  299
 Commissioner   32.11%  23.44  ----  15




 Council-Manager   27.54%  22.42  ----  421
 Mayor-Council   26.72%  20.23  ----  299
 Commissioner   28.59%  25.77  ----  15




 Council-Manager   11.97%  7.58  ----  421
 Mayor-Council   12.78%  7.20  ----  299
 Commissioner   12.60%  5.33  ----  15





Table 5.11        Comparisons of CDBG funding allocations for council structure influences
        Significance
        Level for Mean
     Mean  SD Score Difference  n
Acquisition comparisons
 By-district   5.43%  8.37  ----  221
 At-large    5.99%  11.75  ----  357
 Both by-district & at-large  7.26%  10.26  ----  180




 By-district   15.39%  6.65  ----  221
 At-large    16.64%  8.46  ----  357
 Both by-district & at-large  15.25%  5.86  ----  180




 By-district   5.89%  10.12  ----  221
 At-large    4.75%  9.01  ----  357
 Both by-district & at-large  5.99%  10.83  ----  180




 By-district   30.29%  18.52  ----  221
 At-large    23.33%  20.64  ----  357
 Both by-district & at-large  32.98%  35.88  ----  180




 By-district   28.07%  21.25  ----  221
 At-large    28.31%  22.84  ----  357
 Both by-district & at-large  24.88%  20.63  ----  180




 By-district   11.95%  6.41  ----  221
 At-large    12.54%  7.99  ----  357
 Both by-district & at-large  11.88%  7.19  ----  180





Table 5.12        Comparisons of CDBG funding allocations for Per Capita Income influences
        Significance
        Level for Mean
     Mean  SD Score Difference  n
Acquisition comparisons
 $18k or less   7.00%  10.71  ----  281
 $18,001 - $30k   5.27%  9.24  ----  414
 $30,001 or more   7.96%  16.00  ----  62




 $18k or less   16.24%  6.78  ----  281
 $18,001 - $30k   15.74%  7.24  ----  414
 $30,001 or more   15.90%  10.80  ----  62




 $18k or less   6.73%*(2) 10.92  .05  281
 $18,001 - $30k   4.69%  8.57  ----  414
 $30,001 or more   3.98%  11.49  ----  62




 $18k or less   25.83%*(2) 30.20  .01  281
 $18,001 - $30k   33.51%  19.77  ----  414
 $30,001 or more   25.80%  22.87  ----  62




 $18k or less   28.82%  21.34  ----  281
 $18,001 - $30k   25.98%  21.54  ----  414
 $30,001 or more   30.35%  25.94  ----  62




 $18k or less   11.81%*(3) 7.12  .01  281
 $18,001 - $30k   12.07%*(3) 6.70  .01  414
 $30,001 or more   14.99%*(2,3) 11.32  .01  62





Table 5.13       Comparisons of CDBG funding allocations for Poverty level influences
        Significance
        Level for Mean
     Mean  SD Score Difference  n
Acquisition comparisons
 8.8% or less   4.42%*(3) 10.67  .05  198
 8.9% to 14.1%   6.49%  11.08  ----  181
 14.2% or more   6.85%  10.09  ----  379




 8.8% or less   16.33%  9.04  ----  198
 8.9% to 14.1%   15.81%  7.73  ----  181
 14.2% or more   15.81%  6.45  ----  379




 8.8% or less   3.51%*(3) 9.15  .01  198
 8.9% to 14.1%   4.85%  8.73  ----  181
 14.2% or more   6.61%  10.43  ----  379




 8.8% or less   31.44%  22.43  ----  198
 8.9% to 14.1%   31.04%  19.12  ----  181
 14.2% or more   28.75%  27.89  ----  379




 8.8% or less   29.30%  24.02  ----  198
 8.9% to 14.1%   26.73%  21.48  ----  181
 14.2% or more   26.77%  20.89  ----  379




 8.8% or less   12.57%  7.74  ----  198
 8.9% to 14.1%   12.57%  7.66  ----  181
 14.2% or more   11.85%  7.02  ----  379





Table 5.14       Comparisons of CDBG funding allocations for Unemployment influences
        Significance
        Level for Mean
     Mean  SD Score Difference  n
Acquisition comparisons
 3% or less   5.13%  10.96  ----  197
 3.1% to 3.8%   6.47%  11.49  ----  184
 3.9% or more   6.49%  9.76  ----  377




 3% or less   15.86%  8.72  ----  197
 3.1% to 3.8%   16.12%  6.93  ----  184
 3.9% or more   15.90%  6.91  ----  377




 3% or less   3.99%*(3) 9.36  .05  197
 3.1% to 3.8%   5.51%  9.41  ----  184
 3.9% or more   6.04%  10.15  ----  377




 3% or less   30.74%  22.54  ----  197
 3.1% to 3.8%   33.34%*(3) 35.68  .05  184
 3.9% or more   27.99%  18.15  ----  377




 3% or less   29.49%  24.73  ----  197
 3.1% to 3.8%   25.74%  20.33  ----  184
 3.9% or more   27.16%  21.00  ----  377




 3% or less   12.87%  8.86  ----  197
 3.1% to 3.8%   12.09%  6.83  ----  184
 3.9% or more   11.93%  6.74  ----  377





Table 5.15       Comparisons of CDBG funding allocations for Housing Values influences
        Significance
        Level for Mean
     Mean  SD Score Difference  n
Acquisition comparisons
 $75k or less   7.65%  8.18  ----  134
 $75,001 to $150k   6.11%  10.41  ----  412
 $150,001 or more   5.20%  11.88  ----  212




 $75k or less   15.87%  5.87  ----  134
 $75,001 to $150k   15.93%  7.39  ----  412
 $150,001 or more   16.01%  8.32  ----  212




 $75k or less   5.72%  9.17  ----  134
 $75,001 to $150k   5.63%  9.82  ----  412
 $150,001 or more   4.67%  10.13  ----  212




 $75k or less   32.65%  39.39  ----  134
 $75,001 to $150k   30.17%  19.99  ----  412
 $150,001 or more   27.99%  20.39  ----  212




 $75k or less   25.97%  19.40  ----  134
 $75,001 to $150k   27.49%  22.22  ----  412
 $150,001 or more   28.22%  22.76  ----  212




 $75k or less   10.69%*(3) 6.09  .01  134
 $75,001 to $150k   11.98%  7.32  ----  412
 $150,001 or more   13.62%  7.996  ----  212





Table 5.16        Comparisons of CDBG funding allocations for Racial influence
        Significance
        Level for Mean
     Mean  SD Score Difference  n
Acquisition comparisons
 59.2% or less white   7.39%  11.81  ----  185
 59.3% to 85.5% white  5.96%  10.40  ----  388
 85.6% or more white  5.20%  9.24  ----  185




 59.2% or less white   16.08  7.53  ----  185
 59.3% to 85.5% white  16.32  7.88  ----  388
 85.6% or more white  15.01  6.12  ----  185




 59.2% or less white   7.06 *(2)  11.60  .05  185
 59.3% to 85.5% white  4.84  9.06  ----  388
 85.6% or more white  4.81  9.12  ----  185




 59.2% or less white   24.80*(2,3) 15.86  .01  185
 59.3% to 85.5% white  31.83  29.18  ----  388
 85.6% or more white  31.36  20.52  .05  185




 59.2% or less white   26.80  21.25  ----  185
 59.3% to 85.5% white  27.03  22.60  ----  388
 85.6% or more white  28.85  20.93  ----  185




 59.2% or less white   12.66  6.92  ----  185
 59.3% to 85.5% white  12.25  7.34  ----  388
 85.6% or more white  11.67  7.82  ----  185






Earlier in this chapter, I introduced an ANOVA test to compare the individual
mean allocations of each dependent variable to determine their significance levels.  These
tests yielded many significance results at the .05 level (see Table 5.17).  Unfortunately,
these results do not fully explain how and why CDBG allocations are made.  Because the
decision-making process is so complex, it is important to consider the interactions of all
the independent variables on the dependent variable.  Since the independent variables
may be correlated, it is important to consider the effect that each independent variable has
on the others.  These correlations will tell us which independent variables have an
association with each dependent variable beyond that is already explained by the other
variables.  Additionally, since the dependent variables are related, an increase in one
coefficient is by definition cause for a decrease in at least one of the other dependent
variables.  Therefore, it is important to consider the impact of each independent variable
on the set of dependent variables.  The MANOVA model shown here accomplishes both
of these things.  All the independent variables are included in the model.  It is a
multivariate model (instead of the bivariate ANOVA models presented earlier) and all the
dependent variables are included in the model.  The results show the effect of each
independent variable controlling for the others and shows the strength of the association
each independent variable has with the set of dependent variables and each one
separately.  Through the use of a MANOVA test (see Table 5.18), it is possible to test the
influence of an independent variable by examining them collectively.
After running the MANOVA, there were five independent variables whose results
differed from those found in the bivariate ANOVA models: form of government, race,
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housing values, unemployment levels, and per capita income.  The change in significance
levels between models suggests that there are other explanations, such as demographics
or the economy that help to explain CDBG allocation decisions.
The first difference of the MANOVA test suggests that the mean allocations for
CDBG housing allocations vary significant when the form of government variable is
considered with economic, geographical and political variables.  In the case of a strong
mayor form of government, for example, it is possible that allocation decisions are driven
by reelection concerns and that funding decisions are influenced by a city’s political
environment, wealth or racial balance.
Race, on the other hand, did not prove to be statistically significant when
considered with the other independent variables. These findings are not surprising,
however, since other demographic and economic factors such as housing values and per
capita income often influence CDBG allocations.  Put another way, the decision to fund a
particular public service initiative or public improvement project, for example, has more
to do with the economic health and well being of a community, rather than its racial
makeup.
When housing value was tested without the interactions of other independent
variables, the coefficient for public services is statistically significant.  When other
independent variables are thrown into the mix, however, the significance levels shift from
public services allocation to economic development and housing rehabilitation initiatives.
Although the reason for this shift is unclear, it seems plausible that the influence of
economic data and demographics play a salient role in altering the significance levels for
housing values.  Since housing values are sometimes associated with the popularity of a
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particular region or availability of jobs or industry, the influence of economic
development and the local housing infrastructure becomes salient.
A city’s unemployment rate, without the influence of additional independent
variables, is significant in the allocation of economic development and housing
rehabilitation dollars.  When additional independent variables are introduced, however,
the significance level for any one funding source disappears.  This lack of significance
may be due to a city’s unique economic and demographical structure.  A high growth
area, for example, is more likely to keep unemployment rates stagnant since poverty
levels are lower and job opportunities are plentiful.
The final difference between the MANOVA and earlier results suggest that per
capita income is no longer significantly associated with either economic development or
public services when multiple independent variables are introduced.  Instead, the
association between per capita income and the acquisition and public improvement
variables for CDBG allocations become significant.  This change of significance may be
associated with the influence of a city’s economic and demographical circumstances.  In
other words, income level coupled with geographical location and overall wealth of the
community plays a larger role in determining which public improvements get completed
and which land that gets acquired for future development.  It should also be noted that
housing allocations remained significant for both the individual and multiple variable
tests, suggesting that income levels are significant in the allocation of CDBG monies
irrespective of the other independent variables.
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Table 5.17
Eta Admin.& Economic Public Public
P Value Square Acquisition Planning Development Housing Improvements Services
 Region <.05 <.04 x x x
 City size <.05 <.03 x x
 Form of gov't <.05 .017 x
 Council structure <.05 <.05
 Race <.05 <.014 x x
 Housing values <.01 <.018 x
 Unemployment <.10 <.008 x x
 Per capita income <.01 <.024 x x x
 Poverty <.05 <.018 x x
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
 Table 5.18
Eta Admin.& Economic Public Public
P Value* Square Acquisition Planning Development Housing Improvements Services
 Region <.001 .025 x x x
 City size .02 .021 x x
 Form of gov't .15 .013 x
 Council structure .32 .010
 Race .16 .013
 Housing values .07 .016 x x x
 Unemployment .51 .003
 Per capita income .02 .020 x x x
 Poverty .04 .018 x x
*significance level from the Wilks' Lambda test statistic for the most significant category below the .05 level






Earlier in this study, I argued that the motivations of elected officials, coupled
with the political, economic and social characteristics of a local government, play a
salient role in the way CDBG funds are allocated. I demonstrated that the traditional
distributive politics model, even when blended with a demand-side explanation, is
inadequate as an explanatory tool for how CDBG monies are distributed and used. I
suggested that through an expanded distributive politics model -- one that takes into
account the motivation, form of government, size of city, geographical region, economic
indicators, and racial make-up of a recipient jurisdiction – it is possible to advance a
comprehensive explanation for how and why elected officials, namely mayors, allocate
federal benefits.
I also introduced a symbiotic model, one that parallels a traditional economic
supply and demand model, to help explain the decision-making relationships between the
national, local and bureaucratic stakeholders of an entitlement community.  This model
served as a visual representation of the stakeholders’ interactions and suggested that the
distribution of federal monies is a two-way street, with bureaucrats and politicians at both
the federal and local - levels all acting to secure their own self-interest, while attempting
to keep all other interested parties satisfied.  This model was then applied to the actual
CDBG allocations of four Pennsylvania cities: Altoona, Sharon, Pittsburgh and
Philadelphia.  Through a case study approach, I was able to explain in depth how and
why decision-makers distribute and use CDBG dollars.
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Next, I expanded my four city case study approach to include data from each and
every CDBG entitlement community in the United States that has received or continues
to receive direct CDBG funding from the federal government, so that a broader and more
comprehensive perspective on the distribution and implementation processes for CDBG
monies could be considered.  By looking at the contextual factors on a national level, I
was able to draw conclusions about which factors significantly affect CDBG allocations.
So how does the devolution of federal dollars to the cities help the poor and
disadvantaged?  By looking at the case study and national data, despite the fact that
monies are sometimes redirected for unintended purposes, the majority of the federal
dollars do get redirected to economic development and employment opportunities for the
poor.  Because CDBG dollars must be spent within several broad spending categories, all
designed to benefit low and moderate income people, the bulk of the monies are usually
spent in the spirit in which they were intended.  So does this form of federalism undercut
Washington’s good intentions (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973)?  The answer to this
question is both yes and no: yes in that federal dollars are sometimes redirected to
inappropriate and self-serving uses; no in that the overwhelming bulk of the federal
dollars to assist the low and moderate income population.
The low and moderate income neighborhoods have seen their roads improved,
housing stock updated and their social services increased.  In fact, of the CDBG
entitlement cities examined for 2001, more than 30% of a city’s CDBG allocations went
to housing stock improvements.  Because of this study, several interesting questions arose




For future research, I expand the overall size of my case study population.  For
purposes of this study, I researched four Pennsylvania cities to see how CDBG allocation
decisions were made.  I scrutinized decades of CDBG budgets in the hopes of identifying
funding trends.  I also interviewed elected officials and bureaucratic leaders that
administer the CDBG program to obtain their insight and understanding of their decision-
making processes.  This level of detail helped me identify distinct funding patterns for
large and small cities.  In the future, I would like to analyze data from cities nationwide
to better understand the way elected officials make CDBG allocation decisions.
In the future, I would be interested to see if the relationship between city size and
elected officials’ desire to increase their own visibility could be tested, perhaps by
conducting in depth interviews of city officials by region.  By looking at region along
with the economic, demographic, social and political influences of that city, it might be
possible to more definitely determine whether or not the desire to fund highly visible
projects is limited to larger cities.  Similarly, I could look at electoral competitions for
both small and large cities to continue to clarify how CDBG funding decisions are
correlated with various officials’ incumbencies.  Such expansions of my study would
contribute to detailed explanations of how and why certain contextual factors influence
certain projects for certain cities.
Conclusion
Satisfying campaign promises, obtaining constituent support and gaining
reelection are just some of the constant struggles of holding a public office.  Performing
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one’s job professionally while maintaining constituent support requires both skill and
innovation. When presented with an opportunity to deliver on campaign promises while
gaining constituent approval by expending federal funds, some politicians who control
these funds are tempted to take advantage of this opportunity in ways that might appear
self-serving.  A mayor’s seeming ability to reallocate federal monies at her total
discretion offers unique opportunities for the mayors and program administrators across
the nation to utilize community-intended funding for purposes that are inconsistent with
the program’s intent.
But do allocation decisions that not strictly in line with a federal program’s intent
constitute misappropriation of federal dollars?  Or, might such decisions reflect a mayor’s
sophisticated understanding of how to use available federal monies to truly benefit her
own community?  Unfortunately, the answer to these questions is not clear.  It is clear,
though, that CDBG allocations seem to serve the political interests of the elite while
exhibiting some residual benefits of the poor.  It is these poorest members of the locality
that suffer the greatest consequence of misappropriating federal dollars – diverting
federal dollars from their intended purposes.
The size of a city and its geographical location also plays a role in determining
how federal funds will be spent.  Big city mayors seemingly face very different demands
than their smaller city counterparts when it comes to the sheer volume of interest groups
they must deal with, the strategies in dealing with and appeasing their city-council, the
working relationship with their program supervisors or bureaucrats, and the continuous
threat of viable challengers to unseat them when reelection time occurs.   Whatever the
reason, the allocation and distribution of federal grant dollars to specific projects has
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more to do with the contextual factors that influence a local official’s decision-making
processes than previously thought under the traditional distributive politics model.  My
current and continuing study of these contextual factors will improve understanding and,
potentially, improve predictive and evaluative models for those who engage in and
analyze the past and ongoing distribution of many millions of grant dollars.
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Appendix A:  Interview Protocol
Dear Participant:
 I am conducting an interview to obtain your insight into the Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) program.  The purpose of my study is to understand
how public benefits (grant dollars) are allocated to the cities.  Specifically, I am interested
in the way allocation decisions are made and the role you play in the distribution of
federal grant monies.
 Your input to this interview is completely voluntary.  If you agree to be
interviewed, I will be taking notes of our conversation.  Your responses will be kept
confidential.   In the event that I quote you, I will ask for your oral or written permission
in advance of publication.  Please be advised that you do not have to answer every
question and that my class standing or grade will not be affected if you elect not to
participate in my study.
 Should you have any additional questions or require additional information, you
may contact the Chair of my Dissertation Committee:  Neil Berch, Ph.D. at (304) 293-
3811.  Thank you.
      Sincerely yours,
      Howard A. Stern
      Doctoral Candidate, WVU
      6606 Northumberland Street
      Pittsburgh, PA  15217
      Email: howard.a.stern@city.pittsburgh.pa.us
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Appendix B:  Interview Questions
Last year, the City of ___________ received $________ from the federal
government to expand the economic opportunities and improve the overall living
conditions of individuals living in low and moderate-income neighborhoods.
• Do you know what projects or programs are funded with CDBG dollars OR do
you leave these funding decisions to the program administrators?
• Does your office play a role in the selection and approval of programs and
projects?  If yes, what kind of role?
• Are there any “pet programs” that you encourage or insist to be funded with
CDBG dollars?
• Do you acknowledge or give credit to the individual legislatures (or local elected
officials) that help secure CDBG funding opportunities for your city?
Did you know that 30 percent of CDBG monies can be used to “indirectly”
benefit poor areas?  Because of this program flexibility, some legislators, politicians and
bureaucrats have described the CDBG program as another form of “pork-barrel” politics.
• Would you describe the CDBG program as another form of pork?  It is just
another government program designed to helping elected officials gain visibility
and votes in future elections?
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• What role, if any, do the public or community groups play in the selection of
CDBG-funded projects?
• Have you ever had to respond to a community group that opposed a CDBG
project allocation?  Please explain:
• Would it be more difficult to administer the CDBG program if there were more
council members?
• Do you think the CDBG program is administered fairly without the influences of
politics, media or partisanship?
• Do you have any recommendation for improving the program?
164











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix G:  MANOVA Results
Multivariate Tests(c)
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig.
Partial Eta
Squared
Intercept Pillai's Trace .658 232.779(a) 6.000 726.000 .000 .658
Wilks' Lambda .342 232.779(a) 6.000 726.000 .000 .658
Hotelling's Trace 1.924 232.779(a) 6.000 726.000 .000 .658
Roy's Largest Root 1.924 232.779(a) 6.000 726.000 .000 .658
size_sma Pillai's Trace .016 1.914(a) 6.000 726.000 .076 .016
Wilks' Lambda .984 1.914(a) 6.000 726.000 .076 .016
Hotelling's Trace .016 1.914(a) 6.000 726.000 .076 .016
Roy's Largest Root .016 1.914(a) 6.000 726.000 .076 .016
size_med Pillai's Trace .010 1.266(a) 6.000 726.000 .271 .010
Wilks' Lambda .990 1.266(a) 6.000 726.000 .271 .010
Hotelling's Trace .010 1.266(a) 6.000 726.000 .271 .010
Roy's Largest Root .010 1.266(a) 6.000 726.000 .271 .010
size_lar Pillai's Trace .008 1.037(a) 6.000 726.000 .400 .008
Wilks' Lambda .992 1.037(a) 6.000 726.000 .400 .008
Hotelling's Trace .009 1.037(a) 6.000 726.000 .400 .008
Roy's Largest Root .009 1.037(a) 6.000 726.000 .400 .008
size_vlg Pillai's Trace .021 2.556(a) 6.000 726.000 .019 .021
Wilks' Lambda .979 2.556(a) 6.000 726.000 .019 .021
Hotelling's Trace .021 2.556(a) 6.000 726.000 .019 .021
Roy's Largest Root .021 2.556(a) 6.000 726.000 .019 .021
form_may Pillai's Trace .013 1.562(a) 6.000 726.000 .155 .013
Wilks' Lambda .987 1.562(a) 6.000 726.000 .155 .013
Hotelling's Trace .013 1.562(a) 6.000 726.000 .155 .013
Roy's Largest Root .013 1.562(a) 6.000 726.000 .155 .013
hou_75_150 Pillai's Trace .016 1.954(a) 6.000 726.000 .070 .016
Wilks' Lambda .984 1.954(a) 6.000 726.000 .070 .016
Hotelling's Trace .016 1.954(a) 6.000 726.000 .070 .016
Roy's Largest Root .016 1.954(a) 6.000 726.000 .070 .016
hou_150kmo Pillai's Trace .015 1.882(a) 6.000 726.000 .081 .015
Wilks' Lambda .985 1.882(a) 6.000 726.000 .081 .015
Hotelling's Trace .016 1.882(a) 6.000 726.000 .081 .015
Roy's Largest Root .016 1.882(a) 6.000 726.000 .081 .015
RACE59_3 Pillai's Trace .010 1.211(a) 6.000 726.000 .298 .010
Wilks' Lambda .990 1.211(a) 6.000 726.000 .298 .010
Hotelling's Trace .010 1.211(a) 6.000 726.000 .298 .010
Roy's Largest Root .010 1.211(a) 6.000 726.000 .298 .010
RACE85_6 Pillai's Trace .013 1.546(a) 6.000 726.000 .160 .013
Wilks' Lambda .987 1.546(a) 6.000 726.000 .160 .013
Hotelling's Trace .013 1.546(a) 6.000 726.000 .160 .013
Roy's Largest Root .013 1.546(a) 6.000 726.000 .160 .013
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unem_3.1per Pillai's Trace .003 .392(a) 6.000 726.000 .884 .003
Wilks' Lambda .997 .392(a) 6.000 726.000 .884 .003
Hotelling's Trace .003 .392(a) 6.000 726.000 .884 .003
Roy's Largest Root .003 .392(a) 6.000 726.000 .884 .003
unem_3.9p Pillai's Trace .007 .871(a) 6.000 726.000 .515 .007
Wilks' Lambda .993 .871(a) 6.000 726.000 .515 .007
Hotelling's Trace .007 .871(a) 6.000 726.000 .515 .007
Roy's Largest Root .007 .871(a) 6.000 726.000 .515 .007
PER_18_1 Pillai's Trace .020 2.502(a) 6.000 726.000 .021 .020
Wilks' Lambda .980 2.502(a) 6.000 726.000 .021 .020
Hotelling's Trace .021 2.502(a) 6.000 726.000 .021 .020
Roy's Largest Root .021 2.502(a) 6.000 726.000 .021 .020
PERCA_30 Pillai's Trace .019 2.329(a) 6.000 726.000 .031 .019
Wilks' Lambda .981 2.329(a) 6.000 726.000 .031 .019
Hotelling's Trace .019 2.329(a) 6.000 726.000 .031 .019
Roy's Largest Root .019 2.329(a) 6.000 726.000 .031 .019
pov_8_9 Pillai's Trace .013 1.594(a) 6.000 726.000 .146 .013
Wilks' Lambda .987 1.594(a) 6.000 726.000 .146 .013
Hotelling's Trace .013 1.594(a) 6.000 726.000 .146 .013
Roy's Largest Root .013 1.594(a) 6.000 726.000 .146 .013
pov_14_2 Pillai's Trace .018 2.209(a) 6.000 726.000 .040 .018
Wilks' Lambda .982 2.209(a) 6.000 726.000 .040 .018
Hotelling's Trace .018 2.209(a) 6.000 726.000 .040 .018
Roy's Largest Root .018 2.209(a) 6.000 726.000 .040 .018
cou_atla Pillai's Trace .010 1.175(a) 6.000 726.000 .318 .010
Wilks' Lambda .990 1.175(a) 6.000 726.000 .318 .010
Hotelling's Trace .010 1.175(a) 6.000 726.000 .318 .010
Roy's Largest Root .010 1.175(a) 6.000 726.000 .318 .010
cou_both Pillai's Trace .007 .840(a) 6.000 726.000 .539 .007
Wilks' Lambda .993 .840(a) 6.000 726.000 .539 .007
Hotelling's Trace .007 .840(a) 6.000 726.000 .539 .007
Roy's Largest Root .007 .840(a) 6.000 726.000 .539 .007
Region Pillai's Trace .075 3.128 18.000 2184.000 .000 .025
Wilks' Lambda .926 3.138 18.000 2053.923 .000 .025
Hotelling's Trace .078 3.145 18.000 2174.000 .000 .025
Roy's Largest Root .045 5.403(b) 6.000 728.000 .000 .043
a  Exact statistic





Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Dependent Variable
Type III Sum




Corrected Model Acquisition Allocation 3004.352(a) 20 150.218 1.411 .109 .037
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 881.231(b) 20 44.062 .793 .724 .021
Economic Development
Allocation 3318.746(c) 20 165.937 1.762 .021 .046
Housing Allocation 36606.681(d) 20 1830.334 3.164 .000 .080
Public Improvements
Allocation 19889.783(e) 20 994.489 2.131 .003 .055
Public Service Allocation 3102.828(f) 20 155.141 3.021 .000 .076
Intercept Acquisition Allocation 1437.694 1 1437.694 13.508 .000 .018
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 9287.330 1 9287.330 167.207 .000 .186
Economic Development
Allocation 267.844 1 267.844 2.844 .092 .004
Housing Allocation 23107.001 1 23107.001 39.948 .000 .052
Public Improvements
Allocation 33927.389 1 33927.389 72.689 .000 .090
Public Service Allocation 3351.379 1 3351.379 65.264 .000 .082
size_sma Acquisition Allocation 21.936 1 21.936 .206 .650 .000
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 15.536 1 15.536 .280 .597 .000
Economic Development
Allocation 16.527 1 16.527 .175 .675 .000
Housing Allocation 240.455 1 240.455 .416 .519 .001
Public Improvements
Allocation 2516.926 1 2516.926 5.392 .020 .007
Public Service Allocation 113.747 1 113.747 2.215 .137 .003
size_med Acquisition Allocation 47.013 1 47.013 .442 .507 .001
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 5.236 1 5.236 .094 .759 .000
Economic Development
Allocation 6.925 1 6.925 .074 .786 .000
Housing Allocation 325.101 1 325.101 .562 .454 .001
Public Improvements
Allocation 2511.318 1 2511.318 5.380 .021 .007
Public Service Allocation 19.251 1 19.251 .375 .541 .001
size_lar Acquisition Allocation .354 1 .354 .003 .954 .000
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 41.713 1 41.713 .751 .386 .001
Economic Development
Allocation 38.121 1 38.121 .405 .525 .001
Housing Allocation 580.634 1 580.634 1.004 .317 .001
Public Improvements
Allocation 1618.736 1 1618.736 3.468 .063 .005
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Public Service Allocation 6.037 1 6.037 .118 .732 .000
size_vlg Acquisition Allocation 56.613 1 56.613 .532 .466 .001
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 20.924 1 20.924 .377 .540 .001
Economic Development
Allocation 60.777 1 60.777 .645 .422 .001
Housing Allocation 138.534 1 138.534 .240 .625 .000
Public Improvements
Allocation 3396.053 1 3396.053 7.276 .007 .010
Public Service Allocation 320.583 1 320.583 6.243 .013 .008
form_may Acquisition Allocation .601 1 .601 .006 .940 .000
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 5.087 1 5.087 .092 .762 .000
Economic Development
Allocation 242.012 1 242.012 2.570 .109 .004
Housing Allocation 3260.362 1 3260.362 5.637 .018 .008
Public Improvements
Allocation 263.279 1 263.279 .564 .453 .001
Public Service Allocation 88.398 1 88.398 1.721 .190 .002
hou_75_150 Acquisition Allocation 212.583 1 212.583 1.997 .158 .003
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 3.980 1 3.980 .072 .789 .000
Economic Development
Allocation 293.039 1 293.039 3.111 .078 .004
Housing Allocation 2481.969 1 2481.969 4.291 .039 .006
Public Improvements
Allocation 205.368 1 205.368 .440 .507 .001
Public Service Allocation 160.792 1 160.792 3.131 .077 .004
hou_150kmo Acquisition Allocation 424.321 1 424.321 3.987 .046 .005
Administrative & Planning
Allocation .278 1 .278 .005 .944 .000
Economic Development
Allocation 436.509 1 436.509 4.635 .032 .006
Housing Allocation 748.751 1 748.751 1.294 .256 .002
Public Improvements
Allocation 35.703 1 35.703 .076 .782 .000
Public Service Allocation 77.679 1 77.679 1.513 .219 .002
RACE59_3 Acquisition Allocation 239.363 1 239.363 2.249 .134 .003
Administrative & Planning
Allocation .120 1 .120 .002 .963 .000
Economic Development
Allocation 255.305 1 255.305 2.711 .100 .004
Housing Allocation 1555.899 1 1555.899 2.690 .101 .004
Public Improvements
Allocation 64.155 1 64.155 .137 .711 .000
Public Service Allocation 12.136 1 12.136 .236 .627 .000
RACE85_6 Acquisition Allocation 187.511 1 187.511 1.762 .185 .002
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 125.719 1 125.719 2.263 .133 .003
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Economic Development
Allocation 126.238 1 126.238 1.340 .247 .002
Housing Allocation 297.773 1 297.773 .515 .473 .001
Public Improvements
Allocation 165.011 1 165.011 .354 .552 .000
Public Service Allocation 110.337 1 110.337 2.149 .143 .003
unem_3.1per Acquisition Allocation 6.691 1 6.691 .063 .802 .000
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 14.426 1 14.426 .260 .610 .000
Economic Development
Allocation 60.703 1 60.703 .645 .422 .001
Housing Allocation 244.714 1 244.714 .423 .516 .001
Public Improvements
Allocation 310.178 1 310.178 .665 .415 .001
Public Service Allocation 19.985 1 19.985 .389 .533 .001
unem_3.9p Acquisition Allocation 79.776 1 79.776 .750 .387 .001
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 2.397 1 2.397 .043 .836 .000
Economic Development
Allocation 20.280 1 20.280 .215 .643 .000
Housing Allocation 23.424 1 23.424 .040 .841 .000
Public Improvements
Allocation 9.078 1 9.078 .019 .889 .000
Public Service Allocation 54.488 1 54.488 1.061 .303 .001
PER_18_1 Acquisition Allocation .334 1 .334 .003 .955 .000
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 63.703 1 63.703 1.147 .285 .002
Economic Development
Allocation 238.158 1 238.158 2.529 .112 .003
Housing Allocation 5534.808 1 5534.808 9.569 .002 .013
Public Improvements
Allocation 1761.326 1 1761.326 3.774 .052 .005
Public Service Allocation 2.466 1 2.466 .048 .827 .000
PERCA_30 Acquisition Allocation 754.535 1 754.535 7.089 .008 .010
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 21.819 1 21.819 .393 .531 .001
Economic Development
Allocation 34.263 1 34.263 .364 .547 .000
Housing Allocation 27.050 1 27.050 .047 .829 .000
Public Improvements
Allocation 219.583 1 219.583 .470 .493 .001
Public Service Allocation 176.130 1 176.130 3.430 .064 .005
pov_8_9 Acquisition Allocation 474.229 1 474.229 4.456 .035 .006
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 44.921 1 44.921 .809 .369 .001
Economic Development
Allocation 114.493 1 114.493 1.216 .271 .002
Housing Allocation 78.963 1 78.963 .137 .712 .000
Public Improvements
Allocation 463.935 1 463.935 .994 .319 .001
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Public Service Allocation 75.128 1 75.128 1.463 .227 .002
pov_14_2 Acquisition Allocation 325.574 1 325.574 3.059 .081 .004
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 118.111 1 118.111 2.126 .145 .003
Economic Development
Allocation 490.431 1 490.431 5.207 .023 .007
Housing Allocation 62.617 1 62.617 .108 .742 .000
Public Improvements
Allocation 907.010 1 907.010 1.943 .164 .003
Public Service Allocation 39.061 1 39.061 .761 .383 .001
cou_atla Acquisition Allocation 51.526 1 51.526 .484 .487 .001
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 195.463 1 195.463 3.519 .061 .005
Economic Development
Allocation 35.826 1 35.826 .380 .538 .001
Housing Allocation 148.324 1 148.324 .256 .613 .000
Public Improvements
Allocation 876.792 1 876.792 1.879 .171 .003
Public Service Allocation 177.524 1 177.524 3.457 .063 .005
cou_both Acquisition Allocation 231.947 1 231.947 2.179 .140 .003
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 89.514 1 89.514 1.612 .205 .002
Economic Development
Allocation 4.770 1 4.770 .051 .822 .000
Housing Allocation 428.086 1 428.086 .740 .390 .001
Public Improvements
Allocation 523.399 1 523.399 1.121 .290 .002
Public Service Allocation .135 1 .135 .003 .959 .000
Region Acquisition Allocation 75.412 3 25.137 .236 .871 .001
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 121.482 3 40.494 .729 .535 .003
Economic Development
Allocation 534.746 3 178.249 1.893 .129 .008
Housing Allocation 12579.168 3 4193.056 7.249 .000 .029
Public Improvements
Allocation 4743.652 3 1581.217 3.388 .018 .014
Public Service Allocation 1081.700 3 360.567 7.022 .000 .028
Error Acquisition Allocation 77802.488 731 106.433
Administrative & Planning
Allocation 40602.663 731 55.544
Economic Development
Allocation 68847.919 731 94.183
Housing Allocation 422831.597 731 578.429
Public Improvements
Allocation 341191.338 731 466.746
Public Service Allocation 37537.597 731 51.351






Housing Allocation 1138353.488 752
Public Improvements
Allocation 930354.916 752
Public Service Allocation 153078.988 752





Housing Allocation 459438.278 751
Public Improvements
Allocation 361081.121 751
Public Service Allocation 40640.425 751
a  R Squared = .037 (Adjusted R Squared = .011)
b  R Squared = .021 (Adjusted R Squared = -.006)
c  R Squared = .046 (Adjusted R Squared = .020)
d  R Squared = .080 (Adjusted R Squared = .054)
e  R Squared = .055 (Adjusted R Squared = .029)
f  R Squared = .076 (Adjusted R Squared = .051)
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Appendix H:  Explanation of Variables
The listing below shows the variable name and a brief definition of each dependent
and independent variable.
• Independent variables
State.  Name of state.
Stabbre.    State abbreviation
Cityname.   CDBG entitlement City taken from the 2000 U.S. census.
Region. Region as defined by 2000 U.S. census: midwest, southern,
northeastern, western.
Reg_mid.    Midwest region.
Reg_sout.   Southern region.
Reg_nort.    Northeastern region.
Reg_west.   Western region.
City_pop.   Population of CDBG entitlement city.
Citysize.   Size of CDBG eligible city: very small, small, Medium, large, very
large.
Size_ver.   Very small entitlement city with a population less than 75,000.
Size_sma.  Small entitlement city with a population between 75,001 and
150,000.
Size_med.  Medium entitlement city with a population between 150,001 and
250,000.
Size_lar    Large entitlement city with a population between 250,001 and
500,000.
Size_vlg.   Very large entitlement city with a population greater than 500,001.
Form_gov. Form of government: council-manager, mayor-council,
Commissioner, Town Manager, other.
Form_wea. Council-manager with a weak mayor form of government.
Form_com  Commissioner form of government.
Form_tow.  Town manager form of government.
Form_may.  Mayor-council with a strong mayor form of government.
Hous_val.  Housing value of each CDBG entitlement city based on the 2000
U.S. census.
Hou_quar Housing value categories.
Per-whit.   Percentage white population for each CDBG entitlement city based
on the 2000 U.S. census.
Per-blac.  Percentage black population for each CDBG entitlement city based
on the 2000 U.S. census.
Per-indi.  Percentage American Indian and Alaska Native population for
each CDBG entitlement city based on the 2000 U.S. census.
Per-asia.  Percentage Asian population for each CDBG entitlement city
based on the 2000 U.S. census.
Per-hisp.  Percentage Hispanic or Latino population for 2 races reported
(2000 U.S. census)
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Race_ White vs. non-white populations.
Unemploy.  Unemployment rate for each CDBG entitlement city based on the
2000 U.S. census.
Unem_cat Unemployment categories.
Percapit.  Per capita income for each CDBG entitlement city based on the
2000 U.S. census.
Percap_c Poverty rate categories.
Poverty.   Poverty rate for individuals 18 years or older for each CDBG
entitlement city based on the 2000 U.S. census.
Pove_cat poverty categories.
Cou-elec.  Electing city-council by-district, at-large, both (by-district & at-
large).
Cou_dist.   Elect city-council elected by district
Cou_atla.   Elect city-council at-large.
Cou_both.   Elect city-council by district and at-large
• Dependent Variables
Aquisiti.   CDBG funding allocation for acquiring property in low-income
neighborhoods
Admplng.   CDBG funding allocation for administration & planning purposes
Econdvlp.   CDBG funding allocation for economic development activities
Housing.    CDBG funding allocation for housing purposes
Pubimp.     CDBG funding allocations for public improvement projects
Pubserv.  CDBG funding allocations for public service projects
Data Sources:
• U.S. Census - 2000
• U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  Grantee Use of




• League of cities data
• Websites for U.S. cities
• 2001 Municipal Yellow Book
• City Clerk office for CDBG entitlement city
Population of Interest
• CDBG entitlement cities
Number of Observations:
• 758 CDBG entitlement cities (2001)
